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The Three Faces of Retainer Care:
Crafting a Tailored Regulatory Response
Frank Pasquale*
INTRODUCTION
Retainer care arrangements allow patients to pay a
retainer directly to a physician’s office in order to obtain special
access to care.1 Practices usually convert to retainer status by
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1
Controversies over retainer care extend even to its name.
Congress chose the term “concierge care” in the 2003 Medicare
Modernization and Prescription Drug Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc
(2005); U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PHYSICIAN SERVICES:
CONCIERGE CARE CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
MEDICARE 1 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
This term is
unsatisfactory because opponents have tried to brand retainer
arrangements a mere bauble of the wealthy by using the term
“concierge care,” or the more common “boutique medicine.” At the
other extreme, proponents of retainer care choose terms that go beyond
euphemism into express approbation (such as “innovative practice
design”) or misleading synecdoche (such as “personalized preventive
care”). See Russ Allen, Doctors on Retainer Catch On, RISK &
INSURANCE, Mar. 1, 2005, at 20. “Retainer care” seems to be the best
neutral term for discussing the financing arrangements analyzed in this
article.
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concentrating their attention on those willing to pay a retainer
fee, and dropping the majority of their patients, who are left to be
absorbed by other practices. 2 Also known as “boutique
medicine,” “concierge care,” or “innovative practice design,”
retainer practices have drawn thousands of enthusiastic patients.
They have also provoked scrutiny from politicians 3 and
consumer groups.4 Few recent developments in the business of
medicine provoke emotional conflicts like concierge care.
Concierge physicians are thrilled to break out of the vise of
managed care, lavishing medical attention where they used to
face the stark choice of rationing or involuntarily donating their
services. Critics decry an ever-widening gap between haves and
have-nots, and view concierge care as one more excess for the
wealthy in an age of increasing medical scarcity.
To be sure, there are some irreconcilable ideological
differences between the two camps. Concierge physicians
welcome a commodified tiering of primary care that their
2

Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the Future of
Medicine?, 15 HEALTH LAW 1 (2003); Avram Goldstein, Doctors on
Call–for a Hefty Retainer, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2003, at B1. For a
discussion of three models of boutique medicine, see John R. Marquis,
Legal Issues Involved in Concierge Medical Practices, HEALTH
LAWYERS NEWS, April 7, 2005, at 8.
3
Both Congress and the Department of Health and Human
Services have expressed concern about the access issues raised by the
practices, and at least some affected states have responded with
investigations and regulation. At the national level, several bills have
been offered to prevent physicians in retainer practices from
participating in Medicare. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida and
Representative Benjamin Cardin of Maryland have introduced four
bills so far. None has gotten out of committee, and none appears likely
to do so, though these legislators have managed to require the GAO to
study the spread of concierge care and have held hearings on the topic.
Nevertheless, Congressional attention to the topic has managed to spur
interest at HHS. Consumer-Directed Doctoring: The Doctor Is In,
Even If Insurance Is Out, Hearing Before the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, April 28, 2004.
4
See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, A New Health Care Gimmick:
Concierge Medicine, 19 HEALTH LETTER 10, at 1-2 (Oct. 2003); John
Carrol, Concierge Care by Any Name Raises Ethical Concerns,
MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE 15 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives.
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opponents only grudgingly accept. Yet differences also arise
because the opposing sides have not adequately acknowledged
the diversity of concierge care services. Retainer contracts cover
three analytically distinct actions: preventive care, queuejumping, and amenity-bundling. Most commendably, concierge
physicians are aggressively counseling their patients on how to
avoid getting ill, by developing preventive health plans and
monitoring problematic behavior. More questionably, they are
trading enhanced access for cash—a clear example of queuejumping relative to their previous business practices and the
standard of primary care prevalent in the US. Most troublingly,
they are bundling medical care with unrelated amenity services
(such as lavish waiting rooms and comfort for the “worried
well”) in order to avoid legal and regulatory bars on “balance
billing” and multiple standards of care.
Each of these “faces” of concierge care deserves a
different legal response. Nearly all serious health policy analysts
agree that preventive care is underfunded in the United States.
To the extent concierge physicians are closing that gap, they
ought to be encouraged. However, concierge marketing of
“queue jumping”—the ability to see one’s doctor far more
quickly—and for far longer—than the norm, requires state and
federal oversight for a number of reasons. Tiering in the health
insurance market has already eroded the primary “end” of health
insurance: subsidizing the unhealthy, unlucky, and sick with
funds from the healthy, lucky, and well. 5 Concierge care
threatens to accelerate that process, promoting “exit” from a
managed care system where “voice” is ever more necessary.
Medicare policymakers realized the dangers of such a dynamic
long ago when they proscribed “balance billing,” a practice that
allowed doctors to charge patients themselves for parts of bills
that Medicare did not cover. Both Medicare and private insurers
5

John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 311 (1997) (“The origins of health insurance in both the United
States and Europe involved pooling funds and sharing risk.”); Andrew
Stark, In Sickness and in Health: Health Insurance in America,
DISSENT MAG. 22 (Fall 2005) (“When it comes to private insurance,
apparently, Democrats would have the rich subsidize the sick;
Republicans seem largely content to have the healthy subsidize the
poor.”).

4
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should enforce balance billing rules against concierge doctors in
order to prevent insurance programs from subsidizing ever-more
fragmentation of the risk pool.
Finally, concierge physicians’ bundling of medical
services with unnecessary amenities presents a troubling dynamic
already reflected in the growing demand for cosmetic physical
and mental enhancements. Some states have begun taxing or
otherwise discouraging these diversions of medical personnel.
They should consider similar efforts to discourage concierge
physicians’ efforts to bundle the sale of medical care with
unnecessary amenities, a practice driven more by marketing
efforts and legal concerns than actual medical care.
This article bases these policy prescriptions on an analysis
of current retainer care practices (Part II) and regulation (Part
III). Part IV suggests a resolution of the leading current legal
controversy over retainer care, the applicability of Medicare
balance billing rules to retainer payments. Part V addresses
retainer care physicians’ complaints about current and proposed
regulation, developing a normative framework for further
interventions proposed in Part VI. Although states have taken
some promising steps toward mitigating the worst aspects of
retainer care conversions, taxation may be the only policy tool
sufficiently targeted to reduce incentives for queue-jumping and
amenity-bundling while promoting innovation in preventive care.
II. THE RISE OF RETAINER CARE
Boutique medicine did not arise in a vacuum. A variety
of pressures on providers and consumers of medical care have led
to demand for more intense and personal primary care. The
development of cost-containment measures has left many
physicians complaining about a lack of autonomy.6 Patients have
complained about five-minute office visits, officious staff,

6

See, e.g., Eve A. Kerr, How Satisfied Are Physicians and
Patients When Medical Groups Control Access to Care?, April 1997, at
http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/023332s.htm (“Primary care physicians
are significantly less satisfied with the quality of care they are able to
deliver to patients covered by capitated contracts than those covered by
other payment sources.”).
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interminable waits, 7 and a general lack of concern about their
welfare. 8 Even if these concerns lack empirical foundation,
consumer perceptions of a decline in the availability and quality
of primary care have sparked a great deal of anxiety.9 Retainer
care options address this need by providing “Marcus Welby”
style medical care to their patients.
Part A below describes the background trends in the
health care system that have given rise to retainer care, including
time pressures on physicians, consumers’ demand for more
services, and insurers’ efforts to placate both groups by offering
more ala carte and tiered coverage options. Physician and patient
dissatisfaction with the strictures of managed care has led to
many important trends in health care financing, including
increased tiering and consumer choice in health plans. Part B
explains how retainer care works, focusing on the ways in which
retainer physicians intensify tiering and consumer choice trends.

7

Gina Kolata, Sick and Scared, and Waiting, Waiting, Waiting,
N.Y TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, A1 (describing waits to see doctors, once in
the doctor’s office, and for follow-up visits).
8
Josh Fischman, Who Will Take Care of You?, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, 46 (January 31, 2005). (“Research has shown that a
good conversation that thoroughly explores problems and possible
treatments means better health. . . . [The] relationship [between
physician and patient] has clearly been shown to affect diagnostic
accuracy, adherence to treatment plans, and patient satisfaction.”).
9
Some commentators have suggested that this is merely a matter
of perception. See Gottfried and Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care:
Evidence from the Medical Literature, 65 FALL LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103, 103 (2002). (“The empirical evidence from the medical
literature does not support the allegations of unsafe practices made
against MCOs by proponents of patient protection legislation. This
finding holds despite data suggesting that generalists, who occupy a
privileged position as gatekeepers in many MCOs, are less proficient
than specialists in the latter's areas of expertise, because such a fact
does not appear to translate into worse specialty care for patients in
managed care plan.”).
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A. Background Trends: Resistance to Managed Care
After an extraordinary increase in health care spending in
the 1960s and 1970s, 10 managed care arose in the 1980s in
response to payors’ worries over increasing costs. 11 Insurance
plans controlled by doctors and hospitals had few incentives to
limit medical care or its attendant costs.12 Managed care plans
promised to reduce waste by leveraging the bargaining power of
plan members in negotiations with service providers to drive
down the costs of services and to disapprove treatment options
with doubtful benefits.13
Of course, it is a rare medical procedure that offers no
benefit.14 Disputes have arisen, provoking resistance to managed
care cost-cutting from physicians (who resent the diminution of
their autonomy) and state legislatures (which have begun to force
disclosure of physician financial incentives and to require
10

DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE 34 (2000) (“At the start of the 1990s, before MCOs
[managed care organizations] took over, private sector health spending
was rising by more than 10 percent annually, and many experts
predicted that health care would account for 20 percent of the GDP by
the year 2000. . . . Thanks to MCO’s . . . total spending on health care
remains below 14 percent of GDP.”).
11
Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed
Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS 24, 26 (1993) (describing the economic
consequences of a traditional fee-for-service health care system); Clark
C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard
Politics Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 400 (2001).
12
Thomas H. Greaney, Managed Care: From Hero to Goat, 47
ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 217, 217 (2003) (“At the outset of the [1990’s], most
observers heralded managed care as the solution to spiraling costs and a
guarantor of quality.”).
13
Clark Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care,
supra note 11, at 401.
14
The classic health care economics term for this is “flat of the
curve” care, which increases expenses but offers virtually no hope of
improving outcomes. For such a curve, the x-axis measures spending,
and the y-axis measures some health outcome, such as QualityAdjusted Life-Years. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY
PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 6
(1980).
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coverage of certain care). 15 Despite this resistance, capitation
systems 16 and other pressures to contain costs have already
pervasively influenced physicians’ interactions with patients. 17
Many primary care physicians must see at least 25 to 30 patients
a day18 in order to clear between $100,000 and $300,000 per year
15

See Peter Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy
Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 365 (2003); David A. Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with Patient’s Bill of Rights,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (2000) (listing examples, such as “drive-by
delivery” legislation); David Dranove, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION,
supra note 10. (objecting to these laws as technology-insensitive and
speculating about the technological advances that would have been
deterred had “drive-by hernia” surgeries been outlawed twenty years
ago).
16 ”
Capitation is a method of reimbursement in which a fixed sum
of money is paid per enrollee by the purchaser to the provider. This
sum of money is expected to cover specified services for every enrollee
for a defined period of time.” Treatment Improvement Exchange,
Financial
Considerations,
available
at,
http://tie.samhsa.gov/TAPS/TAP16/Tap16chap4.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2006); see also HALL, BOBINSKI, AND ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF
HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND REGULATION 314-330 (2005) (discussing
capitation payment plans).
17
C. Jackson, Premium Practice: When Patients Pay Top Dollar
For Exclusive Care, AMEDNEWS, Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/09/17/bisa0917.htm; Marian
Hawryluk, Boutique Medicine May Run Afoul Of Medicare Rules,
American Medical News, April 8, 2002; William Hoffman, Fed Up,
Some Doctors Turn To 'Boutique Medicine,’ ACP-ASIM OBSERVER,
Oct.
2001,
available
at
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/pastobis.htm;
Boutique
Medicine: Elitist or Egalitarian?, 19(23) PHYSICIAN'S WEEKLY 10,
June 10, 2002, ("'Primary care physicians average between 20 and 30
patient visits each day. But the average number of 'patient contracts,'
adding in phone calls and 'paper shuffles,' is over 110. In the last ten
years, physician income has declined while the workload has
increased.”).
18
Katherine Hobson, Doctors Vanish From View, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, 50 (January 31, 2005). The average primary care
physician sees 25 people a day. Id. Economic pressure on physicians
results from a number of factors, including “reduced reimbursement
rates, increased overhead costs, and higher premiums for liability
insurance.” Id.

8
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in pre-tax income.19 Some claim that, in response to many health
plans’ per-patient payment methodology, doctors are beginning
to shun the sickest patients, who take up more time than healthier
peers.20 If a doctor fails to follow this strategy, scheduling may
leave her with little more than 15 minutes per patient visit,
regardless of the severity of the problem complained of or the
complexity of the patient’s health history.
Both empirical evidence and anecdotal accounts suggest
that primary care physicians are not happy with these
developments.21 Many consider the strictures of managed care
practice at best an inconvenience and, at worst, a reason for
leaving the practice of medicine altogether.22
Given massive deficits and federal budget cutting, public
funding of medical care is likely to become even more
“managed” than private insurers’ plans. Physicians are frustrated
by concomitant government-imposed cost constraints—and since
federal and state governments account for at least 40% of health
19

“In 2003, the median income for primary care physicians was
$156,902. For general surgeons . . . it was $264,375. . . Busy
orthopedic surgeons, cardiologists . . . and radiologists frequently earn
more than half a million dollars a year.” Atul Gawande, Piecework:
Medicine’s Money Problem, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 4, 2005.
20
Newt Gingrich, A Health Threat We’re Not Treating Don’t Let
Doctors Rig the Market for Specialty Hospitals, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,
2005, at A25 (Physicians are tending to burden community hospitals
with the risky, expensive procedures, while referring the less expensive
cases to the specialty hospitals in which they have a financial interest,
despite Stark anti-kickback statutes that discourage such
“cherrypicking.”).
21
Brian Vastag, Physician Dissatisfaction Growing, 286
JAMA 781 (2001); Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Time Pressures
Leave
Doctors
Dissatisfied,
available
at
http://www.rwjf.org/reports/grr/027069.htm (“If Massachusetts mirrors
the nation, physicians' job satisfaction has taken a hit in the past 15
years, according to a study sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality in conjunction with the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation.”).
22
American Academy of Family Physicians, Comparison of
Primary
Care
Positions,
available
at
http://www.aafp.org/match/graph05.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006)
(documenting entry in (and exit from) the field).

9
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care spending in the U.S., these strictures are becoming
increasingly important. 23
Those reliant on public health insurance programs, such
as Medicaid and Medicare, have had even more cause for
concern. Objecting to low reimbursement rates, some doctors
refuse to treat Medicaid and even Medicare patients. 24 Each
program can be complex and intimidating to beneficiaries. As
Medicaid costs continue to rise, federal and state budget cuts are
leaving many vulnerable citizens outside the health care system
altogether. 25 Both programs’ expenditures are increasingly
scrutinized by auditors eager to penalize overbilling, fraud, and
abuse of the system.26 Though necessary, fraud and abuse law
has grown so complex that it is becoming a trap for the unwary. 27
These laws may chill not only fraud, but also aggressive care that
risks being deemed excessive or abusive in the current legal
climate.28

23

Thomas Bodenheimer & Keven Grumbach, Paying for Health
Care, 272 JAMA 634 (1994) (quoted in HALL, BOBINSKI, AND
ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND
REGULATION 167 (2005)).
24
See William Buczo, Provider Opt-out Under Medicare Private
Contracting, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 2004-2005, at 43.
25
John Jacobi, Dangerous Times for Medicaid, Seton Hall Public
Law
Research
Paper
No.
45,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=845084 (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) (Many
Medicaid reforms proposed in 2005 “would lessen our commitment to
care for the poor and disabled, in some cases pushing vulnerable people
out of public coverage.”).
26
See, e.g., ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
FRAUD AND ABUSE (2005) (a 606 page guide on the topic).
27
James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an
Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy,
22 AM. J. L. & MED. 205 (1996) (arguing that the vagueness and
breadth of these statutes grant “enormous prosecutorial discretion,
which is subject to abuse.”).
28
See Jeremy Fine Bollinger, Doctoring Fraud & Abuse:
Enforcement of the Stark and Anti-Kickback Law in Physician
Recruitment May be Bad for Your Health, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 485,
513 n. 158 (2004) (discussing perverse incentives created by Medicare
fraud and abuse laws).
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Meanwhile, patients are demanding more care and less
restrictions on their choice of procedures and providers.
Although managed care plans have begun to meet this demand by
offering subscribers PPO plans and other more flexible options,
survey evidence reveals dissatisfaction with the health care
system as a whole:
In a nationwide survey of more than 2,000 adults
published last fall, 55 percent of those surveyed said
they were dissatisfied with the quality of health
care, up from 44 percent in 2000; and 40 percent
said the quality of care had gotten worse in the last
five years.29
Patients have even begun to question the utility of hard-won
gains in autonomy, such as increased ability to choose treatment
options.30 Opaque and even perverse rationing mechanisms for
care ranging from vaccinations to hospitalization have raised
resentment and concern.31

29

Benedict Carey, In the Hospital, a Degrading Shift from Person
to Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A1. The survey was
conducted by Harvard University, the federal Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality and the Kaiser Family Foundation, an
independent nonprofit health care research group. Id.
30
See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY
MORE IS LESS 32-33 (2004) (“When it comes to medical treatment,
patients see choice as both a blessing and a burden. . . . [T]he prospect
of a medical decision has become everyone’s worst nightmare of a term
paper assignment, with stakes infinitely higher than a grade in a
course.”); Jan Harris, Awash in Information, Patients Face a Lonely,
Uncertain Road, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005 (“Dr. Russo, [a] West
Orange, N.J., internist who sees 5,000 patients a year, applauds patients
who do their homework. But, he noted, especially when patients are
researching treatment options, they flop down in his office, feeling
inundated.”).
31
See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Improving Vaccine Supply and
Development, 24(3) HEALTH AFFAIRS 680 (2005) (describing federal
government’s repeated recent failures to properly stock and distribute
flu vaccine); Benedict Carey, In the Hospital, a Degrading Shift from
Person to Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A1 (noting rising
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Payors’ pressure for cost containment has also riled
patients. Worried by increasingly harried or unresponsive
doctors, they are demanding change. Insurance plans have begun
to oblige some of these demands. Wary of constantly being cast
as the heavy in the drama of health care cost containment,
managed care organizations have begun incentivizing cost
consciousness instead of imposing strict command and controlstyle restrictions on coverage.32 Cost-sharing, preferred provider
options, and other strategies have emerged in order to widen the
scope of treatments and personnel available to insureds.
Of course, these new options have a price, and they are
only available to those who pay for them.33 Insurers are “tiering”
their offerings, providing consumers with more control over the
range of services they can demand and the depth of coverage they
desire. One of the most important ways of financing new
coverage options for consumers is “segmentation of services
through financial incentives.”34 In exchange for greater choice,
consumers bear more financial risk in two complementary ways:
[H]orizontal segmentation, in which consumers are
induced to choose the richness of coverage based on
levels of patient dissatisfaction with hospital visits and unclear
admittance criteria).
32
Henry Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed Care:
Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53 (1996); Mark Hall,
Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988) [hereinafter
Hall, Institutional Control]; Mark Hall, Rationing Health Care at the
Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1995); David Orentlicher, Paying
Physicians More To Do Less: Financial Incentives To Limit Care, 30
U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996); Andrea K. Marsh, Sacrificing Patients
For Profits: Physician Incentives To Limit Care And Erisa Fiduciary
Duty, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1323, 1342 (1999).
33
Special Issue: The Managed Care Backlash, 24 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL’CY & L. 873 (1999).
34
John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and
Consumerism, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 397, 403 (2003) (citing James C.
Robinson, Web Exclusive, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost
Sharing in Health Insurance Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 20,
2002,
at
W139,
W140,
at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2103Robinson.pdf.).
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variable employee cost share, and vertical
segmentation, in which consumers within plans are
induced to choose providers based on variable
employee cost share.35
Each type of segmentation is designed to encourage costconsciousness among “consumers” of health care, while opening
up new vistas of care options for those able to pay for them.
Insureds act as partners with the plan in calibrating more precise
trade-offs of cost and quality.36
This growing trend toward “consumer choice” in health
care raises the stakes of retainer medicine regulation.37 To the
extent retainer practices avoid serious regulatory scrutiny, they
will likely encourage innovators who want to make health
insurance more a defined contribution than a defined benefit
system. So far, consumer driven health plans, health savings
accounts, and cash-only practices have not become widespread.
However, Congressional and wonkish enthusiasm for these plans
remains high, as evidenced by recent incentives for HSA’s
embedded in the Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug
Act of 2003.38 Whether by design or incidentally, health savings
accounts will be a great boon to the development of cash-only
practices that evade managed care strictures. 39 All these
developments create fertile ground for entrepreneurs seeking
compensation for levels of care they deem necessary or desirable
for patients.

35

Id. at 403
Id. (“As the rate of differential and the number of tiers increases,
co-payments and co-insurance seem less a gentle nudge to conform to
the plan's network design than a mechanism to pass through discounts
arranged between the plan and providers.”).
37
REGINA HERZLINGER, CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND POLICY-MAKERS 10
(2004) (documenting trend toward consumer choice in health care).
38
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2469 (2003).
39
Rhonda L. Rundle, Pay-as-you-go M.D.: The Doctor is In, But
Insurance is Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A1 (describing
advantages of cash-only practices).
36
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B. Physician and Patient Experiences with Retainer Care
The trends toward tiered insurance plans and cash-only
practices and converge in retainer care or concierge medicine,
which offers patients the chance to contract directly with
physicians for services not covered by insurance plans. 40 The
services are diverse; they range from “same or next-day
appointments” to “private waiting rooms.” 41 The fees for
concierge care also vary widely, depending on the reputation of
the doctors involved and the level of care received. A “top-ofthe-line” practice, which accepts no insurance payments, may

40

Retainer care, concierge medicine, and boutique medicine all
designate the same phenomenon. When it mandated a study on the
topic in 2003, Congress defined concierge care as
an arrangement under which, as a prerequisite for the
provision of a health care item or service to an
individual, a physician, practitioner . . . or other
individual-(A) charges a membership fee or another
incidental fee to an individual desiring to
receive the health care item or service from
such physician, practitioner, or other
individual; or
(B) requires the individual desiring to
receive the health care item or service from
such physician, practitioner, or other
individual to purchase an item or service.
42 U.S.C.A. 1395cc (2004). Jennifer Russano provides a good
narrative account of various retainer-financed practices. See Russano,
Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat to American Healthcare or a
Logical Way of Revitalizing the Doctor-Patient Relationship?, 17 J.
LAW & POL’Y 313, 322 (2005).
41
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. The GAO concedes that this
survey is not necessarily representative; however, over half the sample
responded. See also Abigail Zuger, Before You Die, Determine What
You’re Paying For, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 26 (“According to
[concierge patient] Dorothy Lipson, resident of Del Ray Beach,
Florida, the niceties can make all the difference . . . all appointments,
tests, and treatments were coordinated by the concierge practice”).
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cost $20,000 per patient per year; more modest services may only
cost several hundred dollars annually.42
Though a small “cash-only” movement has been opting
out of the managed care system since its inception, retainer
medicine only emerged in the mid-1990’s in Seattle. 43 Since
then, it has spread to a number of (mostly urban) areas.44 Though
“top-of-the-line” retainer practices offer extraordinary amenities,
they also tend not to take insurance or to require clients to file
their own insurance claims.45 However, the majority of retainer
practices depend on both retainer payments and insurance
reimbursement.46 They market more modest services: preventive

42

Of the practices surveyed by the GAO, “the amount of the
concierge care membership fee ranged from $60 to $15,000 a year for
an individual, with about half of respondents charging individual
annual membership fees of $1,500 to $1,999.” GAO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 4. Note that the fees follow a classic bell-curve distribution,
rather than a bimodal distribution that would be expected if practices
were concentrated as high and low-end types. Id., at 13.
43
Gregory M. Lamb, Gold-Card Health Care: Is It Boon Or
Bane?, CHRIST. SCI. MON., May 17, 2004, at 12. Dr. John Blanchard,
president and cofounder of the American Society of Concierge
physicians, has stated:
The current model of healthcare delivery, particularly
in the primary-care setting, is dysfunctional, to say the
least. You’re shuttled through offices like cattle. This
is not the way healthcare was designed. The quality of
healthcare is based largely on the integrity of the
patient-physician relationship – and that relationship
breaks down in a high-volume healthcare setting.
Id.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix B (providing
geographical depiction of retainer care prevalence).
45
See G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob Kurlander, and Matthew K.
Wynia, Physicians in Retainer ("Concierge") Practice: A National
Survey of Physician, Patient, and Practice Characteristics, 20(12) J.
GEN. INTERN. MED. 1079, 1082 (2005).
46
See Concierge Family Medicine Practice, Every Patient is a VIP
to Us, http://www.conciergefamilymedicine.com (conventional health
insurance is still recommended by cash-only practices in order to cover
44
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care, comprehensive physicals, helpful staff and coordination of
care, and guaranteed attention from a dedicated physician within
twenty-four hours of a request for care. 47
The divergence between high- and low-end practices is a
difference not only of degree, but also (at least for the law) of
kind. By opting out of the insurance system altogether, the highend practices are purchasing a great deal of autonomy. However,
they also run the risk of being classified as insurers themselves,
provoking the whole gamut of state regulation that such
classification entails.48 Lower-end practices can avoid that risk
by focusing on insured patients. However, they risk running
afoul of Medicare regulations prohibiting balance billing or false
claims, or of insurance contracts that condition reimbursements
on similar strictures.49 Part IV below deals with these concerns
in more detail.
Retainer medicine has provoked controversy in part
because of the abrupt transition many practices have made to it.
Steven Flier’s story is typical. Disgruntled by time pressure,
falling reimbursement rates, and insurers’ interference with
treatment options, Dr. Flier and his partners transitioned their
practice into Personal Physicians HealthCare in 2000. They cut
their panels by two -thirds or more, each offering a very high level
of primary and preventive care to the first 300 patients willing to
pay a $4,000 annual fee. Patients unable to pay the retainer fee
were understandably perturbed, and widespread media coverage
followed.50 A similar dynamic has played out in many cities.

out-of office expenses such as hospitalization, emergency-room visits,
and diagnostic tests).
47
“Dedicated” in the sense of “your personal physician,” not
merely “loyal” or “devoted.”
48
See discussion in Part VI.A. below; see also Carol M. Ostrom,
Concierge Physicians Medical Model Growing, SEATTLE TIMES, May
28, 2004, at B1.
49
See, e.g., Dukakis v. Massachusetts Medical Society, 815 F.2d
790 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding Medicare’s “reasonable charge”
requirements constitutional).
50
A recent news report on retainer care gives examples of
physicians who permit “volunteer work” or who “grandfather in” extant
patients who really want to stay with their practices. Amy Zipkin, The
Concierge Doctor Is Available (at a Price), supra note 50, at A6.
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The American Medical Association has closely followed
the boutique medicine trend and guardedly endorsed physicians’
right to convert to retainer practices.51 The AMA conducted a
survey of both concierge- and non-concierge-funded physicians
in order to better understand the practice’s appeal to some of its
members. 52 According to this survey, “50% of the retainer
physicians said they thought they were offering more diagnostic
and therapeutic services than traditional practices,” and “70% of
retainer physicians said they were doing better [financially] in
this type of practice than they had in traditional practice.”53 It’s
not hard to see why, given the numbers: “Retainer physicians saw
an average of 11 patients per day; nonretainer physicians saw an
average of 22 patients.” 54 As the GAO report notes, these
patients’ retainer payments in excess of insurance
reimbursements average between $1,500 and $2,000 per year.
About the only downsides for doctors mentioned in the
AMA survey and GAO report are the disapproval of colleagues
51

The CMS report is more positive than the CJEA report, but
neither condemn retainer care. Compare Council on Ethical and
Judical Affairs, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judical Affairs:
Retainer Practices (2003), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_3a03.pdf with Council on
Medical Services, Report of the Council on Medical Services, available
at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/372/cms902.doc
(CMS REP. NO. 9-A-02 (2002)).
52
Jennifer Silverman, Retainer practices reporting better care,
FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS, June 1, 2005, at 71. (reporting that “the
AMA mailed out surveys to 144 physicians from retainer practices-also known as concierge or boutique medicine practices--and received
83 responses. As a control group, researchers mailed surveys to 463
primary care physicians in non-retainer practices from the AMA's
master list, and received 231 responses. Data were collected between
December 2003 and February 2004.”) The primary source data have
not yet been released; they are “still unpublished and have been in
review since January 2005.” Id.
53
Id. The only apparent downsides were legal worries and
reputational concerns. See Silverman, Retainer practices reporting
better care, supra note 52, at 72 (“When queried about the potential
risks of a retainer practice, respondents from both groups expressed
concern that society and their peers would disapprove of their decision
to start a retainer practice.”).
54
Id.
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and the legal uncertainty surrounding this new method of health
care finance.55 Many of the physicians surveyed by the AMA
were concerned about societal and collegial condemnation of
boutique care.56 The GAO reports repeated pleas from doctors
for guidance from HHS on the legality of their practice, or a list
of “safe harbor” practices that will not provoke regulators’
scrutiny.57 Scholars of law and norms would likely be quick to
note the mutually reinforcing character of these concerns. 58
Widespread disapproval of concierge practices may rest on the
conflation of a legal with a normative definition of good medical
practice, while regulators themselves have likely gotten involved
because of the concerns raised by doctors themselves and the
more progressive medical associations.
If either legal or
normative concerns quickly clear up, retainer care could spread
much more quickly than it has since its inception.
Neither the GAO nor the AMA surveyed the patients of
concierge practices.59 Perhaps their names were unavailable or
55

Id.
See Silverman, Retainer practices reporting better care, supra
note 52, at 74 (“‘You risk having people look down their noses at you,’
Dr. Wynia said. In a surprising statistic, ‘5% of people in retainer
practices thought they should be discouraged’ from pursuing this
approach.’
Indeed, several participants at the meeting told this
newspaper that their employer or practice partners did not know that
they were attending a conference on concierge care. More than half of
retainer physicians and 80% of nonretainer physicians thought that
concierge care created a risk of a more tiered system of access to health
care. Loss of patient diversity and insurance contracts and legal
challenges were other concerns cited by the survey respondents.”)
57
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
58
See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social
Norms, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 867, 880 (2001) (discussing how
normative order serves as an extralegal mechanism for influencing
behavior).
59
However, another study did focus on the demographic mix of
patients at concierge practices. According to a recent survey, “Retainer
physicians . . . reported caring for few patients on Medicaid compared
to nonretainer physicians . . . [and] minority patients were also underrepresented in most of these practices.” G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob
Kurlander, and Matthew K. Wynia, Physicians in Retainer
("Concierge") Practice: A National Survey of Physician, Patient, and
56
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retainer physicians were unwilling to encourage scrutiny of a
delicate new financing arrangement. There are essentially two
views of patient experiences. Skeptics charge that these health
care consumers are merely buying the appearance of better care,
without any objective contribution to their health. Proponents of
concierge care tend to view market demand as revelation and
proof of the value of the service. 60 There is some empirical
evidence for the claim; according to one reporter, “patients
buying these higher levels of personal care have been renewing
on a better-than-90-percent annual basis in many practices.”61
Of course, there’s no such thing as a free lunch—where
do the patients unable or unwilling to afford the retainer care
premium go? Hundreds of panelists are often dropped by a
practice in its transition to the retainer model. Both the AMA
and the GAO report that nearly all of these individuals are
“absorbed into nearby practices,” particularly because retainer
care is now only prevalent in urban areas where there are plenty
of doctors.62 Despite these assurances, concerns about consumer
protection, access to care, and public insurance budgets have led
to increasing regulatory and journalistic scrutiny of boutique
practices.
III. CONTROVERSY OVER FEDERAL REGULATION
State and federal policymakers are slowly beginning to
realize the potentially corrosive distributive impact of boutique
medicine.63 The federal Medicare program is the most important
Practice Characteristics, 20(12) J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1079, 1083
(2005) [hereinafter National Survey].
60
Advocates say ‘concierge medicine’ is like having the
neighborhood doctor back; critics call it elitist, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 1,
2005, at B6.
61
Russ Allen, Doctors on Retainer Catch On, RISK & INSURANCE,
Mar. 1, 2005, at 21.
62
See CMS REPORT, supra note 51, at 3; GAO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 14.
63
Carol M. Ostrom, Retainer Fees’ Spark Warning, supra note 48,
at B1; Sandi Doughton, State Looks Askance at Extra Fees for Doctors,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at B1; Howard Gleckman, Want a
Doctor Who Treats You Like Royalty?, BUS. WKLY., May 6, 2002;
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Doctors Are More Interested in Having Higher

19

Retainer Care

factor here, as it has construed the concierge care retainer as a
charge to patients beyond the normal rate in at least one case.64
Sections A and B below describe extant efforts to regulate
concierge care. Federal regulation currently has the perverse
incentive of inducing physicians’ to bundle retainer care with
amenities, in order to characterize the retainer as a charge for
amenities, rather than a second charge for covered services
Medicare already paid for. Unfortunately, the very double-billing
rules designed to enhance access to medical care in the 1980s are
now actually encouraging tiering in the service of their evasion.
A. An Ambiguous Federal Stance
Many members of Congress have claimed that retainer
billing practices are crude evasions of balance billing rules. 65
According to these legislators and some consumer advocates,
retainer practices violate the balance billing rules by effectively
getting paid twice for the same service.66 The basic contention
here is that Medicare beneficiaries with retainer plans are not
only being charged the normal fee for services (which is basically
limited, and paid for, by Medicare), but are also being charged
whatever fraction of their annual concierge care fees can be
reasonably allocated to the service. For example, consider a
Incomes than Providing Better Health Care, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1335
(2002).
64
“Concierge practices say they adhere to the law by ensuring that
their fees pay only for services not covered by insurance or Medicare.”
Pam Belluck, Doctors’ New Practices Offer Deluxe Service for Deluxe
Fee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A1; see also. Editorial, Boutique
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, A28. Critics believe this may be
evasion (and not mere avoidance) of balance billing rules.
65
Letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Tommy
Thompson, Secretary of Human Health Services, Mar. 4, 2002, at 2, on
file with author. (“In 1989, as part of the OBRA [Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act], Congress legislated that “[n]o person may bill or
collect an actual charge for the [Medicare] service in excess of the
limiting charge.” This “limiting charge” now stands at 115% of the
Medicare rate. By conditioning the receipt of all Medicare services on
an annual fee, however, “exclusive” physician practices seem to violate
this law.”).
66
Id.
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hypothetical retainer patient with Medicare who visits her
physician 5 times a year and pays a retainer fee of $3,000
annually. If Medicare sets a $200 reimbursement limit, which the
physician collects, it appears that the patient is not simply being
billed for that $200, but also for $600 additionally for each visit
(with an amount of the retainer proportionally applied to each
visits).67
Conditions on Medicare funding provide important
leverage for the federal government to influence the American
health care system. 68 Participating providers must follow a
complex set of rules for reimbursement. 69 Over 70% of
concierge physicians contacted by the GAO participate in
Medicare, so the program provides some leverage over the
development of retainer care. Medicare regulation may also
provide a model for large private insurers to assure that they are
not subsidizing the tiering of the health care system.70
Though HHS’s response to critics of retainer care was
initially skeptical,71 HHS officials have issued some warnings to
67

Paul Ginsburg, president of the Center for Studying Health
System Change, has claimed that this strategy is “the equivalent of an
end run around Medicare rules.” Michael Romano and Laura B.
Benko, These doctors and their affluent patients find themselves in
exclusive company, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 22, 2001, at 38.
68
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS
& PROBLEM 736 (4th ed., 2001).
69
Id.
70
According to one journalist, “Private insurers, which often
follow Medicare's lead, may also join the fray. Anthem Blue Cross
Blue Shield has barred Virginia doctors from soliciting or accepting
additional payments from patients insured by the company. Most
insurers in the state say they're waiting to see if the insurance
commissioner comes up with new rules.” Carol M. Ostrom, Retainer
Fees' Spark Warning, supra note 48, at B1.
71
Thompson letter to Waxman, et al., supra note 65, at 4
(accepting concierge physicians’ assertion that the retainer payments
only compensated for noncovered services). Thompson has since left
the Department of Health and Human Services, and has become the
chairman of MDVIP’s “Committee on Cost Reduction Through
Preventive Health Care.”
See MDVIP, Press Release, at
http://mdvip.com/pressReleaseThompson.asp (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
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providers about potential violations of the law. 72 The Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and the Office of the
Inspector General (“OIG”) of HHS are currently developing a
regulatory response designed to protect the interests of Medicare
beneficiaries.
CMS outlined its position on concierge care in a
March 2002 memorandum to CMS regional offices
that CMS officials told us remains current as of
June 2005. The memorandum states that physicians
may enter into retainer agreements with their
patients as long as these agreements do not violate
any Medicare requirements.
For example,
concierge care membership fees may constitute
prohibited additional charges if they are for
Medicare-covered items or services. If so, a
physician who has not opted out of Medicare would
be in violation of the limits on what she or he may
charge patients who are Medicare beneficiaries.73
The “additional charges” mentioned are prohibited by “balance
billing rules,” which prevent doctors from charging an amount

72

Carol M. Ostrom, Retainer Fees Spark Warning, supra note 48,
at B8. “The federal government is warning physicians they could face
penalties or even expulsion from Medicare if they charge those patients
for covered services. What are these services? Medicare's fraud alert
isn't spelling it out, but a Minneapolis doctor was busted for charging a
fee for services such as "coordination of care" and "extra time" with
patients. ‘Medicare beneficiaries are entitled to certain services from
their physician,’ said Greg Demske, a chief in the Office of the
Inspector General. If the physicians are asking for extra money for
those services, then that's a problem.’”)
73
Robert M. Portman, Back to The Future of Medicine, supra note
2, at 12. (“The Medicare statute requires physicians to submit claims
for all procedures performed on Medicare patients, even if they do not
accept assignment. It also prohibits physicians who accept assignment
of a patient's claim from charging more than the Medicare fee schedule
amount. Those who do not accept assignment are prohibited from
charging more than 115% of the fee schedule amount.”).
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above Medicare care limits, getting reimbursement from
Medicare, and then charging patients for the balance remaining.74
The balance billing rules arose out of Congressional
concern about potential barriers to access to care for poor and
lower middle class Medicare beneficiaries.75 Without such rules,
physicians could condition services to Medicare patients on the
payment of additional charges that would undermine the
programs’ efforts to provide reasonably-priced health care to all.
Under Medicare balance billing rules, participating
physicians’ charges are limited by the fee schedule prescribed by
the program. 76
Under the relevant statute, physicians who
accept assigned claims are prohibited “from charging more than
the Medicare fee schedule amount.”77 Physicians who “do not
accept assignment are prohibited from charging more than 115%
of the fee schedule amount.”78
74

Markian Hawryluk, Boutique Medicine May Run Afoul of
Medicare Rules, supra note 18 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C)
(2000)); see also Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New
Threat, supra note 41, at 322.
75
“Recognizing that many of the poor could not afford to pay
medical bills, the original Medicare and Medicaid legislation prohibited
physicians from balance billing those Medicare beneficiaries who were
also eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. For all others, however,
Medicare allowed physicians to bill more than the Medicare payment
for services on a claim-by-claim basis until 1983. Since 1983,
physicians have been given the choice to participate or not to
participate under the Participating Provider (PAR) Program, for which
they are given several incentives to enroll.” David C. Colby, Thomas
Rice, Jill Bernstein, and Lyle Nelson, Balance Billing Under Medicare:
Protecting Beneficiaries and Preserving Physician Participation, 20 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 49, 51 (1995).
76
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2) (2005); Robert M. Portman,
Concierge Care: Back to The Future of Medicine, supra note 2, at 12.
(“The Medicare statute requires physicians to submit claims for all
procedures performed on Medicare patients, even if they do not accept
assignment. It also prohibits physicians who accept assignment of a
patient's claim from charging more than the Medicare fee schedule
amount. Those who do not accept assignment are prohibited from
charging more than 115% of the fee schedule amount.”).
77
Id. at 4.
78
Id.
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To the extent that they implicate balanced billing
concerns, retainer practices could also violate the False Claims
Act.79 The Congressional sponsors of legislation to keep retainer
care practitioners out of the federal Medicare system claim that
these physicians “routinely submit erroneous bills to the
government.”80 To return to the hypothetical scenario above,
they insist that the bill for each visit of the retainer care patient is
actually $700, not $200, and that its representation to the
government as the latter is merely a fiction designed to avoid the
strictures of balance billing rules. 81 Retainer care proponents’
79

According to the False Claims Act,
Any person who—
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an
officer or employee of the United States Government . . .
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent
claim paid or approved by the Government
***
is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000,
plus three times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person

31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2005). Critics of retainer care characterize the bill to
the government as a “false claim” that has already been paid for by the
retainer. See Waxman Letter, supra note 65, at 4.
80
Waxman Letter, supra note 65, at 4.
81
“OIG [the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of
Health and Human Services] has addressed the consequences of
noncompliance with Medicare billing requirements. In March 2004,
HHS OIG issued an alert ‘to remind Medicare participating physicians
of the potential liabilities posed by billing Medicare patients for
services that are already covered by Medicare.’ GAO REPORT, supra
note 1 at 27. The alert stated that “charging extra fees for already
covered services abuses the trust of Medicare patients by making them
pay again for services already paid for by Medicare.” Id. As an
example, the alert referred to a Minnesota physician who paid a
settlement and agreed to stop offering personal health care contracts to
patients for annual fees of $600.” Id.
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response to this accusation closely tracks their line on the balance
billing rules. They claim that the services they offer are not
covered by Medicare, so they are not properly billed as Medicare
claims.82
B. Covered or Noncovered Services?
A leading retainer care trade association claims that the
retainer is a payment for “better service, not better medical
care.” 83 This characterization is important, because “‘If
participating physicians decide they want to charge patients
additional fees they should be mindful that they are subject to
civil money penalties if they request any payment for already
covered services from Medicare patients other than the
applicable deductible and coinsurance.’” 84 Medicare covered
services include all “items and services . . . reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to
improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”85

82

Society for Innovative Medical Practice Design, Report to the
General Accounting Office, Aug. 2004, at 15. (copy on file with
author).
83
Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson
Letter, supra note 65, at 2; Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back
to the Future of Medicine, supra note 2, at 5.
84
Acting Principal Deputy Inspector General Dara Corrigan,
Office of the Inspector General Alerts Physicians About Added
Charges
for
Covered
Services,
OIG
ALERT,
at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/2004/FA033104
AssignViolationI.pdf [hereinafter Corrigan Memorandum] (implying
that the concierge amenities at issue fall outside the scope of “Medicare
covered services” and thus should not be subject to “balance billing”
scrutiny.).
85
42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2005). There are of course a long list of
exceptions, codified in subparagraphs appearing after this portion of the
stature. Most important for our purposes are the many preventive
services that Medicare is now covering, including “prostate cancer
screening; bone mass density measurement; diabetic self-management;
mammography screening; glaucoma screening; pap smears; an initial
physical examination; cardiovascular screening blood tests; diabetes
screening tests; and hepatitis B, pneumococcal, and flu shots.”

25

Retainer Care

The distinction between covered and noncovered services
is a term of art of federal health care financing. Medicare tends
to follow the diagnosis and management codes developed by the
American Medical Association. 86
Unfortunately, neither
regulations nor guidance documents appear to clarify application
of this legal distinction to retainer care. 87 However, close
examination of the lists of services offered by concierge practices
discloses that at least some of them are likely covered Medicare
services, as HHS itself determined in at least one case in
Minnesota.88 In that case, the OIG provided three examples of
potentially covered services illicitly charged for by a concierge
physician: “coordination of care with providers, a comprehensive
assessment and plan for optimum health, and extra time spent on
patient care.”89 Unfortunately, the alert did not specify whether

FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 68, at 736 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A)).
86
The statute establishes a substantive legal standard for Medicare
coverage. 42 U.S.C. 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000). There are also regulatory
criteria for National Coverage Determinations. 65 Fed. Reg. 31124
(May 16, 2000) (citing 42 USC 1395y(a)(1)(A) for authority to avoid
coverage of services "not reasonable and necessary.").
87
Joan R. Rose, A Caution Light for Concierge Practices, 81(10)
MED. ECON. 22 (May 21, 2004). Each “improper request” to a patient
for payment can result in a $10,000 fine, plus treble damages. Carol M.
Ostrom, Retainer fees spark warning, supra note 48, at B1.
88
Corrigan Memorandum, supra note 84, at 1-2 ((“For example,
the OIG recently alleged that a physician violated his assignment
agreement when he presented to his patients--including Medicare
beneficiaries – a ‘Personal Health Care Medical Care Contract’ asking
patients to pay an annual fee of $600. While the physician
characterized the services to be provided under the contract as ‘not
covered’ by Medicare, the OIG [Office of the Inspector General]
alleged that at least some of these contracted services were already
covered and reimbursable by Medicare. Among other services offered
under this contract were the ‘coordination of care with other providers,’
‘a comprehensive assessment and plan for optimum health,’ and ‘extra
time’ spent on patient care. OIG alleged that based on the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, at least some of these contracted
services were already covered and reimbursable by Medicare.”).
89
Id.
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only one, or all, of these services was (or were) covered under
Medicare.90
In the case of the third or so concierge practices with
retainer fees below $1,000 per year, it is perhaps believable that
patients would be willing to pay such a fee for more courteous
staff, a nicer waiting room, monogrammed slippers, and other
non-care-related amenities. 91 However, as fees mount, such a
sharp distinction between care and customer service is harder to
defend.92
IV. RESOLVING THE BALANCE BILLING CONTROVERSY BY
DISAGGREGATING RETAINER CARE
In order to resolve the controversy over whether retainers
are prohibited payments for covered services, or permitted
payments for noncovered services, it is important to disaggregate
the range of services provided by retainer care physicians.

90

Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. GAO could not
get clarification despite interviewing the relevant personnel at HHS.
Id. (“HHS OIG did not indicate which, if any, of those three services
were already covered by Medicare. The resulting uncertainty, about
which features of the Minnesota physician’s concierge agreement
formed the basis for HHS OIG’s allegation that he violated the
Medicare program’s prohibition against charging beneficiaries more
than the applicable deductible and coinsurance, generated concern
among some concierge physicians.”)
91
See also Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat
to Access?, supra note 41, at 336. (“If boutique medical practices
provide their patients with bonuses such as heated towel racks, free
hotel rooms, [and] special bathrobes, these amenities could violate the
federal anti-kickback statute or the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act prohibiting such inducements. However, since
these amenities are offered after payment of a retainer, it is likely that
they will be seen as services provided in exchange for payment and not
as an ‘inducement.’”).
92
As the GAO Report notes, “Critics believe that the benefit plans
generally do not exclude coverage for the specific sets of medical
services that the physicians offering retainer contracts say they will
deliver, but rather, cover costs of medically necessary or appropriate
services.” GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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Section A below develops a taxonomy, while Section B applies
that categorization to the legal issues at hand.
A. Three Faces of Retainer Care
Retainer care physicians offer a wide range of services, as
this survey from the Government Accountability Office shows:
Features Offered by Concierge Physicians, October 200493
Feature
% offering
feature
Same- or next-day appointments for nonurgent
99
care
24-hour telephone access
99
Periodic preventive-care physical examination
99
Extended office visits
96
Access to physician via e-mail
94
Access to physician via cell phone or pager
93
Wellness planning
93
Nutrition planning
82
Coordination of medical needs during travel
82
Patient home or workplace consultations
78
Smoking cessation support
77
Preventive screening procedures
72
Newsletter
71
Stress reduction counseling
67
Private waiting room
63
Mental health counseling
60
Online or other electronic access to personal
42
records

Though many commentators have directed praise or blame at
retainer care as a whole, these statistics show that there are many
distinct services offered by concierge physicians. I believe they
may be usefully categorized as

93

From GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
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1. Preventive care (designed to prevent illness or
moderate the effects of chronic illness);
2. Queue-jumping (designed to grant privileged access to
superior health care); and
3. Amenity-bundling (designed to enhance the value of
queue-jumping and preventive care by combining them
with comforts, luxuries, and positive experiences).
I describe each of these categories below.
1. Preventive Care
Nearly all retainer care practices responding to the GAO
survey offer “periodic preventive-care physical examinations.”94
High percentages also offered “wellness planning” and “nutrition
planning.”95 Concierge physicians are particularly proud of this
dimension of their practice. Bernard Kaminetsky, a concierge
physician who has testified before Congress and been profiled in
the New York Times, has frequently argued that his practice
saves the health care system money by minimizing
hospitalizations and emergency room visits via careful
monitoring of patients and constant availability.96 He and other
concierge physicians claim that, after years of feeling they could
never meet their own high standards due to pressures from
managed care, they can finally rest assured that they have
94

GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (Of the concierge physicians
responding to the survey, periodic preventive care, along with same or
next-day appointments and 24-hour telephone access, were the most
frequently reported features).
95
93% offered wellness planning, and 82% offered nutrition
planning. Id. Other practices report the following preventive
measures: “smoking cessation support” (77%); “preventive screening
procedures” (72%); “stress reduction counseling” (67%); and “mental
health counseling” (60%). Id.
96
Bernard Kaminetsky, Testimony of Bernard Kaminetsky, M.D.,
before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, April 28, 2004,
available
at
http://jec.senate.gov/_files/KaminestskyTestimony04282004.pdf (only
55% of recommended preventive care is administered, and only 52% of
recommended screening, presumably leading to increased out-patient
care and healthcare costs).
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provided all potentially helpful primary medical care that their
patients need.
Beyond any particular preventive intervention, the
availability and constancy of retainer care also promises
significant preventive effects. A retainer physician can keep
closer tabs on an array of potentially troublesome developments
in a patient’s weight, habits, or bloodwork. Advice on prevention
from a trusted physician may also be far more effective than a
rote catechism of self-care offered by a harried practitioner.
Concierge care deserves to be encouraged to the extent
that retainer payments fund the type of preventive health care that
many public and private insurers have so far been unable or
unwilling to fund. Cancer screenings, vaccinations, cardiac
rehabilitation, and anti-obesity and anti-smoking behavioral
modification techniques undoubtedly occur at suboptimal rates.
Many harried primary care physicians simply do not have the
resources to provide them. If some entrepreneurs among them
can inspire patients to pay for these socially beneficial programs,
regulatory agencies should not stand in their way.
2. Queue-Jumping
Beyond preventive care, retainer care physicians also
offer far quicker and lengthier access to ordinary care. Nearly all
of those responding to the GAO survey offer “same- or next-day
appointments for nonurgent care,” “24-hour telephone access to
physicians,” and “extended office visits.”97 Nearly as many offer
access to physicians via e-mail, cell phones, or pagers.98 Many
concierge physicians “coordinate medical needs during travel,” or
visit their patients at their home or workplaces. 99 A smaller
number offer “priority for diagnostic medical tests in affiliated
facilities.”100
Given most concierge physicians’ commitment to a
“unitary standard of care,” such patients are not “skipping in
front of” other patients within concierge practices. However,
97

GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (Table 2). These features are
often reported as the most important features distinguishing concierge
practices from more traditional primary-care practices.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. (27%).
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they only attained this level of care by effectively outbidding
those unable or unwilling to pay the required retainer. Moreover,
considering the baseline of primary care availability, they are far
“ahead” of those in non-concierge practices. The average
American waits several days for an office visit, is subjected to
more delays once at the doctor’s office, and more than half of
such visits last less than 20 minutes.101 By contrast, concierge
patients get near-immediate access, through both traditional
visits, house-calls, and even e-consultations and phone calls.102
The term “queue-jumping” usually refers to individuals’
effort to spend their way past the “lines” for rationed care in
order to get immediate attention. The term has been most
commonly used in analyses of “parallel” public and private
health care systems, such as those prevailing in the United
Kingdom, where the ten percent or so of the population that buys
private insurance can use it to fund access to physicians whose
attention they would normally need to wait weeks or months to
get.103
Given that the overall mix of public and private spending
in the United States has led to waits, on average, for primary
care, there is a rather direct analogy between queue-jumping via
concierge care in the U.S. and queue-jumping via private
insurance or private payment in primarily public systems. But to
be analytically rigorous, it’s helpful to distinguish between
jumping the queue to get rapid access and jumping ahead to
more intense, lengthier, or more expert office visits. The latter
issues raise interesting problems, which might be developed by
thinking about the extant, somewhat random, distribution of
above-average primary care.
Before concierge care, we may assume that some doctors
were giving care as intense, expert, and dedicated as concierge
physicians. However, the distribution of such doctors was
101

Josh Fischman, Who Will Take Care of You? supra note 8, at

46.
102

Bill Sonn, Concierge Medicine Physicians Weigh Financial,
Ethical Issues, PHYSICIANS PRACTICE DIGEST, 2002, available at
http://www.shands.org/professional/ppd/practice_article.asp?ID=23.
103
Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10
HEALTH MATRIX 3, 16 (2000) (discussing parallel public and private
health systems in the United Kingdom).
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somewhat random. Perhaps some clung to an older standard of
care, limiting their panels even as managed care squeezed
effective compensation per patient. Some were in rural areas
where there just weren’t that many patients to treat. Some were
just exceptionally energetic. Getting such a doctor was desirable,
but left to chance and individual initiative, as people sought out
recommendations of a “good” physician from family, friends, and
coworkers. The sick (and perhaps the worried well) could be
counted on to expend real energy in finding an exceptional
primary care physician; those needing less care would probably
not find the effort worth their while.
Admittedly, the informal “sorting” of doctors has always
tracked class distinctions in the United States. The better-off are
more likely to have the time, connections, and skills necessary to
find quality primary care. Some of the best-off have long opted
for “cash-only” practices, upon which the toniest retainer care
practices have been modeled. Retainer care promises to expand
the scope of the commodification of primary care quality. No
longer do merely those wealthy enough to go “cash only” have
the opportunity to command the attention of retainer doctors. As
the buying power of this class expands, the doctors most capable
of taking advantage of it via retainer care are likely to be the best
doctors, or at least those with a superior reputation.104 Retainer

104

Robert A. Berenson, Consumer-Directed Doctoring, Capital
Hill Hearing Testimony to the House Joint Economic Committee,
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony (April 28,
2004).
[I]t is likely that relatively healthy, affluent individuals
would be the group most likely to opt out of
comprehensive insurance products, leading to high
insurance costs for those whose health problems give
them no choice but to remain in the basic health
insurance pool. As healthier families and individuals
opt out of traditional insurance coverage, those
remaining in comprehensive health plans would be
more expensive to insure. This will lead to destructive
market segmentation, driving up premiums for
traditional coverage even further and setting off a
spiral of adverse selection. The comprehensive health
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patients are likely to want, not merely more time from a
physician, but also quality time with aquality physician.
These likely dynamics point to distinct facets of the
“queue-jumping” so important to the retainer care model.
Retainer payments guarantee a) quicker access to care—the
classic definition of queue-jumping familiar from countries with
parallel public and private systems. But they also promise b)
better health care, when they permit payors to leverage buying
power into access to more skilled or dedicated physicians.
Retainer patients are thus relatively advantaged (vis a vis
nonretainer patients) by gaining quicker access to better care.
3. Amenity-Bundling
Yet just how far can retainer care physicians’ standard of
care diverge from the normal standard? Some commentators
have been skeptical, pointing out that virtually any decent
primary care practice will provide patients with a call service and
quick attention (or a referral to a emergency room) in case of a
serious problem.105 As mentioned above, several commentators
suggest that current levels of dissatisfaction with managed care
relate more to perception than reality. Perhaps a great deal of the
dissatisfaction stems from the near-automatic anxiety generated
for many by today’s health care system. For those already sick,
the prospect of grappling with billing disputes and officious staff
might be enough to keep them away from the doctor altogether.
As their moniker suggests, concierge physicians try to
make the interactions with the health care system more like the
lavish treatment at a fine hotel. Over half of those responding the
GAO survey offered a “private waiting room.” 106 Thirty-one
percent offered “home delivery of medication by physician or

insurance option would become unaffordable precisely
for those who need its protection.
Id.
105

Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the Future of
Medicine, supra note 2, at 3.
106
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (63% of respondents claimed
to offer this feature).
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office staff.”107 Concierge practices generally pride themselves
on making interactions between staff and patients as amenable
and productive as possible.
Some sensationalistic media reports have also focused on
the more extravagant “perks” of concierge patients:
monogrammed bathrobes, heated towels, and slippers. Although
these reports probably don’t accurately represent the patient
experiences at most concierge care practices, they suggest the
direction of competition in the future. Health care is often
characterized by economists as an experience good--a service
whose value is hard to judge critically until after it’s been
rendered—or a credence good, whose value can really only be
judged by experts. 108 To the extent discriminating consumers
want to compare concierge practices, they will often have little to
go by other than the appearance of doctors’ offices and the perks
they provide.
Would competition on amenities be a good development?
There are several reasons to doubt that. Amenity bundling, like
many statutory and regulatory requirements for managed care
coverage which stymie the provision of more “cut-rate”
offerings, can be deeply inegalitarian.
Clark Havighurst’s
critique of “managed care” mandates (which require health plans
to cover procedures like in vitro fertilization) applies a fortiori to
amenity bundling:
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Admittedly, this is not a “luxury” for those unable to get to a
pharmacist. Unfortunately, the GAO survey does not reveal what
percentage of retainer patients taking advantage of this service were not
able to get to the doctor.
108
William M. Sage and Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View of
Health Care Antitrust, 65-Fall LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 270 n.
104 (2002) (“Many health care services are what economists call
credence goods, meaning that consumers cannot necessarily assess their
quality even after consuming them.”) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 951-52 (1963)). With “credence goods, there exists
an information asymmetry between buyers and sellers, leading to
consumers never knowing the extent of goods that they actually need.”
Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, available at
http://www.rje.org/abstracts/abstracts/1997/Spring_1997._pp._107_119
.html.
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[T]he elite classes, including many selfproclaimed consumer representatives as well as
organized professional groups . . . design and
maintain a system that meets their own particular
needs but leaves less privileged citizens who are
not qualified for publicly financed care with a
Hobson's choice: either coverage for ‘Cadillac’
care or no health coverage at all. Ruled as it is by
and for dominant elites, the U.S. health care
system imposes large, unfair, and unnecessary
economic burdens on ordinary working people.109
Scholars outside health law also raise concerns about amenities.
As Lior Strahilevitz has demonstrated, “exclusionary amenities”
are widely used by housing developers in order to discourage
“unwanted” groups from affecting the character of the
neighborhood, without running afoul of antidiscrimination
laws. 110 For example, a condominium association which only
wants childless singles and couples to join may write into the
relevant covenant a requirement that all residents subsidize a
variety of amenities such families are unlikely to use. 111
Luxurious amenities may be valuable to those who can afford
them, but also tend to increase already troubling trends toward
economic apartheid.112 Though some may be inevitable in the
housing market, health care should not be conditioned on one’s
ability to purchase lavish services unrelated to therapeutic ends.
The problem lies not only in the substance of amenitybundling, but also in its form. Bundling has provoked antitrust

109

Clark Havighurst, How the Healthcare Revolution Fell Short
65 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 86 (2002).
110
Lior Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential
Communities (Univ. of Chicago, Law & Economics, Working Paper
No. 250, 2005), at 2 (“People interested in residential homogeneity
inevitably will try to thwart integration using creative substitutes for
overt discrimination.”).
111
Id., at 1.
112
CHUCK COLLINS AND FELICE YESKEL, ECONOMIC APARTHEID
IN AMERICA 31 (2000) (discussing inequality and public health).
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scrutiny in certain industries.113 Since the rest of concierge care
services often are not available outside a package including
amenities, they are offered in a particularly tight type of
bundling. 114 Admittedly, it would be difficult to apply recent
doctrine on “bundled discounts” to retainer practices given their
lack of market power, and their failure to market the components
of retainer care separately in the past.115 Yet perhaps the very
difficulty of such an analysis suggests the need for valuing the
component part of retainer care more carefully.116 As Section B
below shows, often amenities are emphasized not simply for their
own sake, but to provide “something else to bill for” to avoid
liability for double billing for covered services.

113

David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle
and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for
Tying Law, 22 YALE J. REG. 37 (2005); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 3M’s
Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, U. CHI. L. REV. 243
(2005) (discussing leading case 3M v. LePage’s.).
114
Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable
Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the
Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 707, 708 n.2
(2005) (charting six types of bundling, based on whether components
are available separately or not).
115
Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1689 (2005) (explaining that leading recent
antitrust cases addressed "bundled discounts", which occur “when a
seller offers a collection of different goods for a lower price than the
aggregate price for which it would sell the constituent products
individually.”). Since the concierge physicians aren’t presently selling
amenities separately, it would be very difficult to determine whether
suspect “bundled discounting” actually occurred.
116
And, perhaps, the chilling effects of antitrust liability here. A
rational seller might decide to vigorously resist any decomposition of a
package of goods it sells in order to avoid liability for bundling if it
later decides to sell them together. Just as balance billing rules may
unintentionally promote the bundling of amenities into retainer care
packages, so too might potential antitrust liability for bundling
unintentionally chill the constructive efforts of sellers to break a
package of retainer services into its component parts. Worries over the
unintended consequences of regulation drive the conclusion, in Part VI
below, that targeted taxation of the troubling parts of retainer care
probably amount to the best regulatory response at this time.
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B. What are the Retainer Payments For?
Nevertheless, amenity-bundling is likely to persist,
because amenities play an important role in the business model of
concierge physicians: they provide legal cover for the assertion
that retainer payments are compensation for noncovered services.
Strategic concierge physicians tend to assure that their contracts
specify that retainer payments are only made in consideration for
uncovered amenity and preventive care. 117 For example,
Personal Physicians HealthCare hired attorney Michael Blau to
legally restructure their practice in order to distinguish payments
for ordinary medical services and those for preventive and
amenity care:
Personal Physicians HealthCare PC was formed to
provide healthcare services and contracts with all of
the various insurance payers. Its structure was
almost identical to that found in the physician’s
office; and as a corporation, it was authorized to
offer all medically necessary covered services.
Personal Physicians HealthCare LLC was formed as
a client services corporation that charges the $4,000
annual fee. This umbrella of services would also
cover PPHC’s in-house nutritionist and personal
trainer, the doctor-patient communication system of
email and cell- phone access and other PPHC
custom-designed patient services.118

117

See, e.g., MDVIP Membership Agreement (section entitled
“Medical Care Services Excluded from Annual Membership Fee”)
(attachment to Waxman letter).
118
Gregory L. Stoller and Christopher Ferrarone, The Patient is
Always Right: Personal Physicians Healthcare 8 (2004) (copy on file
with author). The “dual structure” was also used for accounting
purposes. “ ‘[M]ost insurance plans cover medically necessary house
calls However, if the house call is for the patient’s convenience, then it
is not covered under insurance and would be “paid for” by the patient’s
annual fees from the LLC.’” Id.
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One of the founders of this “dual structured” practice explains
that the arrangement works in part because “LLC buys time
from the PC so that our doctors are not busy.”119
Groups like PPHC would like to characterize all these
LLC payments as being “for” noncovered preventive and amenity
care, even if they dwarf the amount paid directly for insurancecovered medical care and the relevant doctors spend more time
on the latter than the former. The mere legal form or labeling of
payments should not dispose of questions about what they are
Some of the amenities offered by retainer
actually for. 120
physicians are merely “better services,” but it is unlikely that
retainer patients paying several thousand dollars annually are
merely paying for monogrammed bathrobes or friendlier office
staff. Rather, these are payments for medical care itself.
Retainer care services may be usefully categorized as
amenity, preventively therapeutic, and directly therapeutic.
Given extant patterns of Medicare funding, we can predict that
those services falling into the last category would likely qualify
for Medicare coverage, and those in the first would likely fall
outside the program’s purview. Certainly the categories don’t
directly map onto coverage decisions, which are inevitably
idiosyncratic given the degree of discretion vested in the
Secretary by the statute. 121 However, given the number of
retainer care services that reasonably fall into the “directly
therapeutic” category, the OIG could reasonably presume that at
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Id.
Michael Romano, If you have to ask, you can't afford it;
Boutique practices getting a hard look from government, doctors'
group, MODERN HEALTHCARE, March 25, 2002; Lawmakers challenge
legality of "boutique medicine, CLINICIAN REVIEWS, May 1, 2002, at32
(Leading Democratic Congressmen “requested a review of the legality
of these practices,” because “current law states that providers who do
not accept the Medicare fee schedule can charge no more than 115% of
the Medicare rate for a covered service.”).
121
Goodman v. Sullivan, 712 F. Supp. 334, 338 (1989) (“Congress
delegated to the Secretary the authority to promulgate regulations for
administering the Medicare program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a) (2005),
and provided the Secretary with great discretion in determining what
items or services will be covered under Medicare Part B.”)
120
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least part of the retainer fee charged at many practices is
supplementing Medicare payment for covered services.122
Many defenders of concierge care claim that the retainers
only pay for “better service,” not better health care. This
nomenclatural smoke screen has obscured what’s really
objectionable about concierge care: the bidding away of primary
care resources by those wealthy enough to “jump the queue”
effectively created via tacit managed care rationing. To the
extent concierge physicians are bundling amenities with retainer
care in order to avoid legal liability for double billing, law is
encouraging the worst distributive consequences of the retainer
care trend. Bundled amenities only tend to make concierge care
more unaffordable, and serve no legitimate therapeutic purpose.
Admittedly, the valuation of each facet of retained
services will be difficult. But to the extent the distinction is a
sham, insurers should step in to avoid subsidizing the type of
struggle for positional advantage (in access to care) that queuejumping is likely to encourage. For patients with insurance,
retainer payments raise the type of “double payment” concerns
addressed by Medicare’s balance billing rules, the False Claims
Act, and similar provisions in private insurance contracts. The
relevant authorities should scrutinize these arrangements in order
to minimize the extent to which public and private insurers are
subsidizing retainer conversions primarily designed to provide
priority access. These conversions serve only to fragment the
risk pools that insurance is designed to unify.
The Medicare program can be powerful policy lever for
encouraging retainer practices to concentrate on preventive care
and to avoid promoting the kind of frenzy for position that
122

GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. HHS has issued a
memorandum that “states that retainer agreements could be problematic
if they attempt to substitute for Medicare supplemental insurance
policies. CMS officials reported encountering problems with physicians
offering unregulated supplemental policies in the mid-1990s. In June
2005, CMS officials told [the GAO] that, while such substitutions are
not allowed, they are no longer concerned that retainer arrangements
are being used as substitutes for Medicare supplemental insurance.” Id.
The GAO unhelpfully fails to cite to the date or title of the memo it
refers to, and a search of the HHS website for the document has proven
fruitless. Kenneth T. Bowden II and Lawrence L. Foust, Advanced
Issues in Provider/Payer Managed Care Contracting and Negotiations
12 (2005) (file on copy with author).
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“queue-jumping” for ordinary medical care may cause. 123 A
majority of retainer physicians responding to the GAO’s survey
participate in the Medicare system, and retainer patients skew
toward the elderly. By cutting out reimbursements for ordinary
medical care already paid for by retainer fees, HHS could reduce
the financial appeal of the retainer model, as well as its potential
to increase queue-jumping. Part VI below suggests some
methods of decomposing the value of the different facets of
retainer care.
V. SHOULD RETAINER CARE BE FURTHER REGULATED?
Though Medicare has great influence over the U.S. health
care system, it does not exhaust the potential range of regulatory
responses to retainer care. Balanced billing rules may also prove
to be too blunt an instrument to simultaneously diminish queuejumping and promote preventive care. Other options, including
state regulation, may achieve health policy goals in a more
nuanced way.
Before examining these options, it is important to address
the normative question—should retainer care be further
regulated? Any fair approach to this question requires a careful
airing of the concerns of concierge physicians and their patients.
Retainer care physicians’ complaints about regulation
break down into four main types. First, many argue that retainer
care is simply too insignificant a phenomenon to merit sustained
attention from regulators. They also argue that gains in time and
compensation from concierge care will encourage more medical
students to become primary care physicians. Finally, retainer
care physicians argue that they treat some of the sickest patients,
and it is unconscionable to deny treatment options to those
willing and able to afford them.
123

Admittedly, if Medicare requirements get too burdensome,
HHS risks losing influence over them to the extent that retainer
practices exit the public insurance program altogether (and perhaps
become “cash only”). See William Buczo, Provider Opt-out, supra
note 25, at 43. There are many anecdotal accounts of physicians “about
to opt out of the system entirely” due to insurers’ burdensome
administrative requirements. However, a recent study suggests that few
providers recently given the option to opt-out of Medicare. Id.

40

Retainer Care

Parts A through D below elaborate these concerns and
critically examine them. Although advocates of retainer care
make some compelling arguments for permitting it in a certain
range of cases, a tailored regulatory response is essential to
mitigating its worst effects.
A. A Self-Limiting Phenomenon?
Proponents of retainer care have tried to deflect regulation
by insisting that it is a “self-limiting” phenomenon that would
only threaten access to care if it were to become widespread.124
A nascent phenomenon in health care finance, retainer medicine
has not yet affected the vast majority of providers or patients.
The GAO’s report, one of the most comprehensive so far, stated
that “The small number of concierge physicians makes it unlikely
that the approach has contributed to widespread access
problems.”125 Some predict that is likely to remain the case for
the foreseeable future. According to one leading academic and
policy advisor, though “[c]oncierge care may remain attractive to
a limited number of high income-individuals. . . it is not likely to
become an important component of the American health care
system.”126
This characterization of retainer care is essential to its
current justification. As the AMA’s Council on Ethics and
Judicial Affairs warns, if boutique medicine were to become
widespread, or even to “take over” a certain market, it would
certainly raise concerns about access.127 But the AMA’s Council
on Medical Practice downplayed such concerns, and both
124

Troyen Brennan summarizes these responses (from health
lawyers and the AMA) in a seminal article on the topic. Brennan,
Luxury Primary Care: Market Innovation or Threat to Access?, 346
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1165, 1167 (2002).
125
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
126
Stuart Altman, Concierge-style health care perks not likely to
revolutionize
medical
services
field,
http://my.brandeis.edu/news/item?news_item_id=100466&show_releas
e_date=1 (Describing speech by Stuart Altman, a leading health care
economist and co-chairman of The Massachusetts Governor's and
Legislative Health Care Task Force. Massachusetts has been one of the
least interventionist states with respect to retainer care.)
127
CEJA REPORT, supra note 51, at 3.
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advisory groups claimed that the value of pluralism in consumer
and provider options outweighs any negative effects of retainer
conversions.
As of mid-2005, about 250 physicians have concierge
practices.128 The largest concierge care network, MDVIP, based
in Boca Raton, Florida, “has 85 doctors in 14 states serving
27,000 patients.” 129 The GAO reports a continuous growth in
retainer practice since its inception in 1996.130 Nevertheless, the
same report concludes that “The small number of concierge
physicians makes it unlikely that the approach has contributed to
widespread access problems.” 131
The Medical Practice
Committee of the American Medical Association goes further on
the prevalence question, deeming retainer medicine an
“inherently self-limiting” phenomenon:
The phenomenon of retainer practice is inherently
self-limiting. The more physicians charge for their
services, the smaller the demand for their services.
Retainer practices will generate higher costs for those
patients who are willing and able to pay for higher
levels of service, but not necessarily for those
patients who cannot afford those higher levels of
service. These economic realities limit any potential
for widespread adoption of retainer practice and any
potential for growth in retainer practice to adversely
impact patient access to care.132
This analysis suggests that, like most other luxury goods, retainer
care will simply be enjoyed by a small elite and will not divert
128

Amy Zipkin, The Concierge Doctor is Available (at a Price),
supra note 50, at 6.
129
Id.
130
See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at Appendix C (charting rate of
prevalence of retainer practices).
131
The GAO was directed to study concierge care pursuant to the
Medicare Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.
132
F. Maxton “Mac” Mauney, Report of the Council on Medical
Service,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/372/cms902.rtf (site last visited March
1, 2006).
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resources from others. Or if it becomes widespread, physicians
will flood into the market and increased supply will bring costs
down.
This simple model of supply and demand ignores several
peculiarities of the market for professional services in general,
and medical care in particular. On the supply side, the number of
doctors available cannot rapidly increase simply because a new
model of financing increases demand for their services. Supply
is rigidly limited by restrictions imposed both on the number of
medical schools and on the number of residencies available after
undergraduate medical education. 133 On the demand side, the
dynamics of positional goods and auction effects are poised to
push retainer care toward a “tipping point” of ever-increasing
bidding for physician services. 134
The economics of positional
goods suggests the rapidity with which bidding wars for superior
professional services can escalate in response to changes in the
financing patterns of markets for knowledge-based services. 135
It is odd to hear proponents of boutique medicine use its
rarity as a rationale for not regulating it, since legal controls (or
uncertainty over their application) may themselves be the reason
for its rarity. Much health care financing innovation is driven by
the legal system—including the statutes governing Medicare,
state insurance law, and the mass of regulations and guidance
documents that interpret those laws. It is no surprise that
133

See KENNETH M. LUDMERER, A TIME TO HEAL: AMERICAN
MEDICAL EDUCATION FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE ERA
OF MANAGED CARE 214 (1999) (on the role of the “Liaison Committee
on Medical Education,” “established in 1942 as a cooperative effort of
the Association of American Medical Colleges and the Council on
Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical
Association.”)
134
ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 7 (1985) (noting that
positional goods are "sought after . . . because they compare favorably
with others in their own class"); FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO
GROWTH 1-12 (1976) (positing that the pursuit of self-interest to
advance "to a higher place among one's fellows" results in an
overconsumption of private goods, reducing the overall net social
utility).
135
See, e.g., Robert Frank’s discussion of the polarization of
incomes among dentists in, infra note 150 .
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physicians, uncertain of the legal status of retainer medicine,
have not rushed to embrace the idea. 136 But if the relevant
authorities were to decisively adopt a laissez-faire position, they
would greatly diminish the marginal cost of conversion to the
retainer model caused by legal uncertainty. Legal uncertainty is
itself a major cause of the current scarcity of boutique practices,
and it is simply disingenuous to argue that the former should be
eliminated on account of the latter.
Supporters of concierge care have argued that retainer
arrangements are not significant enough to regulate because they
only affect a small number of providers. However, regardless of
the degree of diversion of resources now occurring, boutique
medicine is likely to prove much more attractive to upper and
middle class consumers of health care as it gains in notoriety.137
As soon as one person in a reference group purchases concierge
care, their peers are likely to ask: “How can I deny this to
myself? Or my children?”138 Given the special significance of
health care, there are many consumers who will accept nothing
less than the “best” available. As boutique health care creates
new opportunities to break through extant “ceilings” (upper
limits) of care generated by public and private insurance systems,
it generates new channels for the wealthy to bid away resources
from pooled risk purchasers.
For example, when considering several brands of
insurance with similar patterns of coverage, a rational consumer
136

Reporting on its survey of retainer physicians, the GAO
reported that “Various strategies for concierge care practice design
have been developed to help concierge physicians avoid potential
Medicare compliance problems, but most of our survey respondents
expressed a need for more information from HHS to guide them.”
GAO Report, supra note 1, at 17.
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Mike Norbut, Appeal of Retainer Practices: Boutique Care
Goes Mainstream, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, August 4, 2003,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2003/08/04/bisa0804.htm.
138
See, e.g., TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 6 (1995)
(describing bandwagon effects of informational cascades in presidential
primaries and the fashion world); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE
LEISURE CLASS 12 (1905); DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS [BOURGEOIS
BOHEMIANS] IN PARADISE (2004).
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would naturally consider the reimbursement policies of each and
the degree of access to doctors they permit. Few would want to
be part of an aggressively cost-containing plan, if only because
doctors would be more likely to avoid them as patients.139 To the
extent the plan limited or delayed reimbursement, their
attractiveness as a patient relative to other insureds would
drop.140 Conversely, to the extent the plan guaranteed quick or
generous reimbursement for procedures, an insured’s
relative attractiveness as a patient would increase.141
Since most large insurance companies’ business plans
require them to spread risk over thousands of subscribers for each
particular product they offer, they do not yet offer a very wide
variety of specifically tailored plans to subscribers. 142 The
average large employer, for instance, only offers a few different
plans to its employees. 143 However, with the rise of concierge
care, medical practices are cutting out the middleman and
offering a tailored version of insurance directly to their
patients.144
In this way, retainer medicine permits consumers to
distinguish themselves even further in the pool of insured
139

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 68, at

762.
140

Mark O. Hielper & Brian C. Dunn, Irreconcilable Differences:
Why the Doctor-Patient Relationship Is Disintegrating at the Hands of
Health Maintenance Organizations and Wall Street, 25 PEPP. L. REV.
597, 606 (1998).
141
Deven C. McGraw, Student Author, Financial Incentives to
Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required To Disclose These To
Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1839 (1995).
142
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 201 (4th ed., West 2001).
143
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 68.
144
William Hoffman, American College of Physicians, ACP-ASIM
Observer,
October
2001,
available
at
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/oct01/new_model.htm.
In
order to avoid state regulation of insurance plans, many retainer
practices dispute this characterization of the fee, claiming that it is
simply a fee for “better service,” not for “medical care” itself. I give
some reasons for skepticism about that characterization in Part VI
below (discussing the recent history of state insurance regulation
applicable to provider-sponsored organizations (PSO’s)).
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patients. Whereas before one could only buy the best health plan
one’s employer offered, concierge care permits one to leverage
such a plan into extraordinary primary care and lavish related
services.145 Meanwhile, the retainer collected by those offering
this level of service allow them to treat fewer patients while
making the same (or, often, more) income than they made when
only third-party insurers paid.146
Therefore, concierge care intensifies the pressures for
relative position already present in the insurance market. As
more consumers opt for the concierge model, less doctors are
available to the rest of the market. The resulting scarcity makes
the concierge model all the more relatively attractive, portending
a self-reinforcing exodus from third-party insurance
simpliciter to the type of third-party-payor + retainer-payment
model.
The combined effects of supply restrictions and positional
competition (by physicians, for income, and patients, for care)
raise the possibility that concierge care conversions may be a
self-reinforcing, rather than a self-limiting, phenomenon.
Looking back on the literature on the conversion of non-profit
hospitals to for-profit status over the past decade or so, it is
remarkable how often the terms “rapid,” “sudden,” and
“revolutionary” are used to describe the development. 147 Of
course, commentators had several explanations for the apparent
inevitability of the trend once it was well-established. The forprofit chains skimmed off the most profitable work; they had far
145

Vasilios J. Kalogredis, Physician’s News Digest, Should You
Consider
Concierge
Medicine?,
http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/204.kalogredis.html
(Feb.
2004).
146
Andrew Haeg, Minnesota Public Radio, Top Shelf Health
Care-- If
You
Have
the
Money,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200206/24_haega_conci
ergecare/ (June 24, 2002).
147
See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES
AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 126 (1996) (“Historically, one segment of
the hospital industry was for-profit, but such hospitals were invariably
locally owned. In less than a decade, the vast majority have now
become owned by absentee companies, usually the result of mergerand-acquisition binges orchestrated by entrepreneurs.”) (citing Balance
Sheets that Get Well Soon, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 4, 1995 (80-84).
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more access to capital necessary for technology-intensive care,
and thereby initiated a competitive dynamic that severely
disadvantaged non-profits.148 The same trends are now fueling
the rise of specialty hospitals, which only perform surgeries with
very high profit margins. 149 These market dynamics may also
direct the most profitable patients toward retainer care.
Doctors feel increasingly pressed for time with their
family or outside-work interests, and for money to pay off
education debt and malpractice insurance. Few will reject an
opportunity to increase income and leisure simultaneously
without serious thought. MDVIP appears so confident of the
trend that it has even attempted to franchise its business model.
More subtle, but just as powerful, pressures are also important.
Any given primary care physician’s frame of reference for her
“correct” or “fair” compensation will usually include the other
doctors in her area who work around the same amount as she
does. 150 Once one concierge care practice begins reporting
extraordinarily high incomes, it should not be surprising if others
follow suit. Indeed, if retainer care were to become widespread,
insurance practices may start taking the compensation into
account in their reimbursement levels, much as restaurant owners
depend on waiters’ tips to supplement inadequate wages.
Thus retainer care threatens to intensify already-existing
trends toward polarization of incomes in professional services.
Previous tiering made specialty practice more remunerative than
148

Id.
David Armstrong, A Surgeon Earns Riches, Enmity by Plucking
Profitable Patients, WALL ST. J. 1 (Aug. 2, 2005) (“The debate [over
surgeon Larry Teuber’s Black Hills Surgery Center] mirrors national
concerns about specialty hospitals, which are typically doctor-owned
for-profit facilities that focus on a narrow range of services. Critics say
specialty hospitals harm hospitals that serve poorer and sicker patients,
and lead to waste of health care dollars by driving people to get
unneeded surgery.”).
150
See Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public
Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832 (1997). Frank discusses how satisfaction is
often directly related to one’s relative position. In a society where
nearly all doctors work long hours, no one doctor doing so is likely to
feel dissatisfied about his or her situation. However, once a sector
within the profession begins to work less, at the same (or greater) pay,
dissatisfaction is likely to arise.
149
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primary care; now primary care itself is becoming more stratified.
Consider the story of dentists, health professionals whose
reliance on “out-of-pocket” payments has been greater than that
of physicians for some time. Among dentists in the 1980’s, there
was a dramatic shift in the distribution of their
earnings about the median. Whereas fewer dentists
earned incomes in the moderately high range of
$60,000 to $120,000, the numbers increased sharply
at both the low and high ends of the earnings
spectrum.151
Robert Frank gives a number of explanations for the trend,
including the decline in demand for “primary dental services”
(due to increased fluoride use), the rise in demand for cosmetic
dentistry, and a decline in the number of students accepted
annually to dental school (from around 6,000 in 1982 to 4,000 in
1994). Each of these has parallels in a primary medical care field
affected by retainer care: consumers increasingly seeking direct
access to specialists (via PPOs) and “cosmetic” amenities like
better waiting rooms and staff treatment, and a declining number
of primary care hours available. A practitioner aware of trends
in fields like dentistry, sales, and law would be cautious about
missing out on a chance not only to enhance her current position,
but also to avoid consignment to the bottom of the physician
income scale (where those who fail to entrepreneurially market
their services seem increasingly likely to go).

151

ROBERT H. FRANK, WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY 89 (1995).
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B. Physician Shortage?
Advocates of retainer care may accept all the arguments
made in Part A above, and turn them into another, more forwardlooking argument for concierge medicine. Even if rapid
increases in primary care physician incomes cause painful
adjustments now, they will eventually draw more doctors to the
field. To the extent they improve doctors’ salaries and living
conditions, retainer practices may divert health care dollars to a
cash-strapped primary care system (and, presumably, away from
the specialty care that has come to dominate both medical school
curricula and the professional aspirations of the most ambitious
medical students).
Several sources have documented a decline in the number
of new physicians choosing primary care (although there
appeared to be a slight uptick in the late 1990s as managed care
began directing funds to these frontline doctors as
gatekeepers). 152 Presumably, opportunities for a “lifestyle”
practice in primary care may cause some would-be
dermatologists
and
radiologists
to
reconsider
their
specialization. 153 More pointedly, those who are strongly
motivated by monetary gain may be led away from traditional
specialty choices back to primary care.
This article does not attempt to assess the wisdom of
drawing more physicians away from specialty practice and into
primary care.154 However, even if one concedes the desirability
152

2001 was the fourth straight year that the amount of medical
school seniors choosing primary care dropped. American Academy of
Family Physicians, Comparison of Primary Care Positions, available at
http://www.aafp.org/match/graph05.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
153
These very competitive residencies are in fields that are often
chosen by those concerned about controlling their hours. Sid
Kircheimer, Med Students More Likely to Choose Specialties Based on
Lifestyle, WebMD Medical News (Sept. 2, 2003), available at
http://my.webmd.com/content/article/73/82011.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2006).
154
There has been a great deal of controversy over the proper
number of physicians in the United States. There were alarming
reports of an impending physician shortage in the 1960s. KENNETH
LUDMERER, TIME TO HEAL, supra note 126, at 398. The federal
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of this goal, the spread of retainer care seems a singularly
inefficient way of achieving it. Physicians in the U.S. already
earn two to three times as much as their counterparts in
Europe. 155 To the extent retainer care incentivizes physician
training by reducing workload, it would tend to exacerbate the
primary care physician shortage. Retainer doctors see between
one-tenth and half of the panels borne by their non-retainer
peers. 156
Moreover, they primarily serve the type of
sophisticated, wealthy health care consumers who seem best able
to navigate the health care system on their own.157 Finally, there
go
vernment responded by increasing funding of undergraduate and
graduate medical education. Id., at 401. Proponents of managed care
claim that the program “worked too well,” producing a glut of
overcapacity that third-party payers have only begun to wring out of the
system. DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION, supra note
11, at 54. Commenting on the decline in medical school applications in
the mid-1990’s, Dranove later admits that “with the complex
combination of incentive problems in the market, it is impossible to
determine whether we have too few or too many physicians, or receive
too few or too many services.” Id., 129.
155
Gawande, Medicine’s Money Problem, supra note 20 (noting
average primary care physician salary of about $155,000 in 2003); Paul
Krugman, The Medical Money Pit, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 2005, at A16
(noting that American physicians earn two to three times as much as
their European counterparts).
156
John D. Goodson, a primary-care physician and associate
professor at Harvard Medical School, puts it this way: “‘Think about
this in a macro way. . . Say you lose 10 or 15 percent of your doctors.
In the overall system, you end up reducing by a significant percentage
the patient-hours of care, and everyone else who's left behind is
suddenly working harder. There is already a shortage of primary-care
docs. What's to prevent any doctor from starting to charge fees? The
whole thing could mean the Balkanization of American medicine."
Goodson, quoted in Devin Friedman, Dr. Levine’s Dilemma, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., May 5, 2002, at 23.
157
See G. Caleb Alexander, Jacob Kurlander, and Matthew K.
Wynia, Physicians in Retainer ("Concierge") Practice: A National
Survey of Physician, Patient, and Practice Characteristics, 20(12) J.
GEN. INTERN. MED. 1079, 1083 (2005) [hereinafter National Survey]
(“[W]e found that retainer physicians have smaller proportions of
patients with diabetes, and perhaps other chronic diseases, than do their
nonretainer counterparts and they care for fewer African-American and
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appear other, less stratifying alternatives available—such as
expanding the number of medical schools, the number of doctors
they train, or the number of foreign nationals permitted to
practice in the United States.158
Despite these options, groups like the AMA would likely
point to falling medical school applications as evidence that the
present level of compensation, prestige, and leisure available to
physicians is not enough to incentivize the lengthy and costly
educational investment medical practice now demands. 159
However, given the limited number of patients that retainer
doctors see, it seems very inefficient to use this type of financing
arrangement to counteract the trend. Since retainer care is
primarily being adopted by more established practices, it seems
just as likely the physician-hours brought “off line” by retainer
conversions will swamp the putative wave of new applicants
drawn to practice by retainer care. The retainer care model only
permits doctors to increase income and leisure time by reducing
the number of patients they see—sometimes quite
dramatically. 160 Finally, and most importantly, the number of
slots in undergraduate and graduate medical education are fixed,
Hispanic patients. Given that minorities are already underserved and at
risk for worse health outcomes, our findings suggest that retainer
practices could contribute to tiering of health care and to disparities in
health care according to race as well as wealth.).
158
See, e.g., Mexican Physician Pilot Program, CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 853 (discussed in Jeremy Fine Bollinger, Doctoring
Fraud & Abuse, supra note 29, at 513).
159
Randal C. Archibold, Applications To Medical Schools Decline
For Second Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A23 (noting
that factors in the decline include "a more difficult job market for
medical school graduates, and complaints by doctors of excessive
paperwork and a loss of autonomy brought on by the growth of
managed care." Additionally, "Jordan Cohen, president of the
American Association of Medical Colleges, agreed that the economy
might explain the decline but also blamed the growth of managed
care.").
160
See Alexander, et al., National Survey, supra note 157, at 1082
(“Retainer physicians have much smaller patient panels (mean 898 vs
2303 patients, P<.0001) than their nonretainer counterparts, and care
for fewer African-American (mean 7% vs 16%, P<.002), Hispanic (4%
vs 14%, P<.001), or Medicaid (5% vs 15%, P<.001) patients.”).
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and there are far more applicants than slots for each.161 Even if
retainer care somehow motivated a massive increase in the
number of medical school applications, its proponents identify no
mechanism that would lead to a commensurate increase in the
capacity of medical schools to educate them.162
C. Treating the Sickest Patients?
Proponents of concierge care claim that it takes upon
itself a reverse moral hazard that ultimately alleviates pressures
on the health care system. Given a simple model mapping
demand for health care to willingness to pay, only those patients
needing the most attention from the health care system should be
willing to pay for concierge care. This is a potentially powerful
argument given the concentration of health care costs among the

161

“U.S. medical schools graduate roughly 17,000 new physicians
every year, out of over 45,000 students a year who apply.” The Doctor
Quota
, J. COMMERCE, March 4, 1997, at 8A (describing “campaign” by
U.S. doctors to “restrict the number of foreign-trained physicians in the
United States.”). The AMA strictly controls the number of medical
schools, and "There are still two applications for every opening at
medical school, and, on average, the academic qualifications of
applicants hasn't changed. So there is still a cadre of highly qualified,
dedicated, and smart people going to medical school.” Barzansky,
quoted in Sid Kircheimer, Med Students More Likely to Choose
Specialties Based on Lifestyle, WEBMD MEDICAL NEWS (Sept. 2,
2003), available at http://my.webmd.com/content/article/73/82011.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
162
Indeed, the medical profession’s tight control over the number
of doctors is the main cause of the current primary care physician
shortage. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economic and Moral Case for
Lettting the Market Determine the Health Workforce, in THE US
HEALTH WORKFORCE: POWER, POLITICS, AND POLICY 8 (Ellen
Osterweis, et al., eds., 1996) (arguing that “advocate[s] for artificial
limits on entry into the profession ought to be able to explain . . . [to]
the thousands of qualified and highly motivated American youngsters
who have vainly sought entry into medical school and who quite
probably would have been willing to practice medicine at rates much
below those now customary in the profession [why] their rejection
serves the nation’s best interest.”)
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chronically ill (i.e., the sickest 10% of the population). 163 If
retainer physicians are treating the sickest patients, they may well
be reducing demand for health care to the same extent their
retainer care conversions reduce the supply of primary care
physician-hours.
There are several reasons to doubt this possibility.
Although health care costs in general may be concentrated
among the chronically ill, there is little evidence that primary
care demand is similarly focused on this group. More directly,
given the high percentage of retainer physicians reporting more
leisure time after the transition to concierge care, it seems
incongruous to attribute to them the assumption of the burden of
the sickest. As the most recent comprehensive study of retainer
practices noted,
[C]ritics of retainer practices have argued that these
practices might attract wealthier and healthier
patients (the "worried well") rather than sick patients
with complex illnesses, who tend to be less wealthy
but who might benefit most from the additional
attention retainer practices can offer. . . . [W]e found
that retainer physicians have smaller proportions of
patients with diabetes, and perhaps other chronic
diseases, than do their nonretainer counterparts and
they care for fewer African-American and Hispanic
patients.164
163

John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Drirected Health Care and the
Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 531, 572 (2005) (“Consider
how consumer-driven care will affect spending for those on the upper
end of the consumption curve--the 10 percent accounting for 70 percent
of the cost. Those with severe acute and chronic illnesses will incur
costs that dwarf their HSA contribution and deductible. Despite the
savings gained by transferring these initial costs to the sickest
members, sponsors gain no cost-saving value from HSAs for the lion's
share of annual health expenditures.”)
164
Alexander, et al., National Survey, supra note 157, at 1082. The
authors of the study do concede that “Our data are limited to
physicians' estimates of their patients' demographic and illness
characteristics and therefore do not allow for examination of case-mix
severity in detail.” Id.
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To understand demand for retainer medicine, we should focus
less on the concentration of care on the chronically ill and more
on the concentration of resources in the hands of the wealthiest.
D. Freedom of Contract?
In the face of these challenges, retainer care advocates are
likely to fall back on freedom of contract. To the extent that
powerful private insurers have attempted to perform the roles of
rationing and cost-containment required of national governments,
it is not surprising that consumers are attempting to contract
around their strictures in order to purchase care. 165 Even if
retainer care has doubtful positive social impact, why shouldn’t
individual patients and doctors have the right to contract with
each other for retainer services?
Retainer care advocates take some comfort in the
existence of “parallel private systems” of health care that exist in
nearly all nations with a dominant national health care system.166
As Timothy Jost has observed,
In countries with universal public health services
(the Beveridge model), persons who purchase
private health insurance do so in order to obtain
health services more quickly and conveniently, in
more pleasant settings, or from more prestigious

165

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do?
National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 433, 434
(2004) (“Access to health care would no longer depend on belonging to
a social insurance plan (which was usually, in some sense,
employment-related), but rather would be free at point-of-service to all
residents. Thus, universal coverage was created independent of the
economic or employment status of any individual.”).
166
Jost, supra note 165, at 435 (“social-insurance and national
health insurance nations usually allow for individuals the choice to
carry private insurance. France and Austria, for instance, requires
mandatory coverage for the entire population, while Germany and the
Netherlands requires participation in social insurance programs for only
the indigent.”).
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professionals than is possible under the public
system to which they also have access.167
Even the Quebec health care system, which had long attempted to
discourage “contracting around,” has now been forced to permit
it due to a recent Canadian Supreme Court ruling.168
Given that even the most egalitarian national insurance
systems permit the wealthy to purchase either more immediate
access to health care or better health care, restrictions on boutique
medicine in the United States’s highly privatized system might
seem incongruous. If the Canadian Supreme Court has decreed a
fundamental right to purchase health care above and beyond that
provided by the state, even at the cost of diverting suppliers away
from the system overall, 169 how can a sensible American

167

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care Regulation: Can We
Learn From Others? The Chilean Experience, 32 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 863, 864 (1999) (citing Deborah J. Chollet & Maureen Lewis,
Private Health Insurance: Principles and Practice, in INNOVATIONS IN
HEALTH CARE FINANCING 104-09 (George J. Schieber, ed., 1997))
(describing the role of private health insurance in 10 OECD and 36
non-OECD countries). Jost explains that “In the United Kingdom, for
example, persons rely on private insurance normally to permit queuejumping for certain kinds of surgery, while in Australia private
insurance pays for hospital care in private facilities. In some countries
with social health insurance systems (the Bismark model), on the other
hand, private health insurance is limited to persons, usually with high
incomes, who are not legally obligated to participate in the national
social insurance program. This is the situation, for example, in
Germany and the Netherlands.” Id.
168
Jacques Chaoulli and George Zeliotis v. Attorney General of
Quebec and Attorney General of Canada, 2005 SCC 35 (CanLII)
(2005) (holding that sections of the Health Insurance Act which
outlawed private medical insurance violated the right to personal
inviolability as guaranteed by the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms).
169
This diversionary impact is a well-documented phenomenon.
See Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10 HEALTH
MATRIX 3, 16 (2000) (noting that parallel private system in the United
Kingdom “redistribute[d] access to resources and manpower in favour
of better off patients of working age who live in London and South East
England” as “[t]he more privileged sick (in terms of income, class and
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commentator propose to limit the same process here? There are
three main reasons why retainer care in these single payer
systems poses less of a concern than it does in the United States.
First, each of the nations that permits tiering also provides
universal insurance. Though the United States has a patchwork
of law, charity, and government assistance that assures eventual
care to everyone once their condition reaches a certain level of
seriousness (or once they are impoverished enough), this
patchwork does not assure the same level of social provision for
the neediest prevalent in more social democracies.170 Therefore,
concerns about diversion of care are not nearly as pronounced in
these countries as they are in the United States. And recent
studies have demonstrated that even in these systems, there are
significant diversionary concerns.171
power) have been ‘substituted’ for the less fortunate sick who remain
on NHS lists”).
170
See Jacobi, Ends of Health Insurance, supra note 5, at 315
(“While many European countries maintain pockets of private
insurance or are experimenting with competitive components to a
statutory health insurance system, only the United States relies on a
competitive private marketplace and voluntary coverage to provide
health insurance to the majority of its citizens.”).
171
Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10
HEALTH MATRIX 3, 17 (2000) (“Certainly, the claims that the
introduction of market economy principles into the NHS in 1991 has
led to a two-tier system of care (patients registered with fund holding
practices have easier access to care than those in non-fund holding
practices). This might have been one of the reasons why the new
Labour government has abolished the internal market and fund
holding.”); J. Cullis, Waiting Lists and Health Policy, in RATIONING
AND RATIONALITY IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 23-27 (S.
Frankel and R. West, eds., 1993); Canadian Health Services Research
Foundation, Myth: A parallel private system would reduce waiting time
in
the
public
system,
available
at
http://www.chsrf.ca/mythbusters/pdf/myth17_e.pdf
(arguing
that
England and Australia both have private systems, and that it's been
determined that waits for public health care are longest in areas that
have the most private coverage.); Canadian Health Services Research
Foundation, Private Care and Public Waiting, available at
http://www.aha.asn.au/publications/articles/issues/ahr_29_1_0205/ahr_
29_1_087-093.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (reaching the conclusion
that private care leads to longer public waits.); Parallel Private Health
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Second, nearly all of these countries enjoy lower levels of
“background inequality” than the United States. As Robert Frank
has argued, positional bidding dynamics are most pronounced in
countries with high levels of inequality.172 There is simply more
discretionary income to spend on health care, leading to greater
potential diversion of resources once the wealthy start bidding on
enhanced access to a pool of primary care physicians whose
supply is relatively fixed in the short and medium term.173
Finally, more progressive income taxation in these
universal systems dampens supply-side pressures toward
concierge care as well. As advocates of laissez-faire never tire of
reminding us, higher income tax rates reduce the incentive to
Insurance in Australia: A Cautionary Tale and Lessons for Canada,
available at ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp515.pdf (an
Australian study reaching the conclusion that a second, private tier
creates more problems than it solves, most notably a decrease in public
access to health care.).
172
See FRANK AND COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY 216
(1995) (proposing progressive taxation to reduce the inequality that
exacerbates positional pressures).
173
“Estimates suggest that as one's income increases by some
percentage, the demand for health insurance also increases, but at
roughly half that rate.” Joseph P. Newhouse & Charles E. Phelps, NEW
ESTIMATES OF PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES OF MEDICAL CARE
SERVICES, IN THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE HEALTH
SERVICES SECTOR 261 (Richard N. Rosett, ed., 1976). “Medical
tourists” from the “first world” are promoting the segmentation of the
health sector in many countries. Health Care Systems and Approaches
to Health Care Report, available at http://www.ghwatch.org/2005
report/B1.pdf (“Health care systems in some countries are being
segmented even further by the processes of globalization– in India,
Mexico and South Africa private providers cater to foreign ‘medical
tourists’ from high-income countries or from high-income groups in
low- and middle-income countries. The assumption behind these
policies is that it is more efficient and equitable to segment health care
according to income level – a public sector focused on the poor and a
private system for the rich that allows the public sector to focus on the
poor. But there is no evidence that such a system is more equitable or
efficient. The greater likelihood is that it would result in increased
inequality as the middle-classes opt out of public sector provision, take
their financial resources and stronger political voice with them, and
leave the public service as a ‘poor service for poor people.’”).
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maximize one’s income. We can therefore expect the higher
income tax rates in social democracies to diminish physicians’
incentive to switch to a concierge model.
VI. CRAFTING A TAILORED REGULATORY RESPONSE
The concerns raised in Part V above suggest that retainer
care deserves more, not less, regulation. Part IV suggested a
principled way for the Medicare program to discourage
concierge care by applying balanced billing rules. The federal
government could also seek to apply the False Claims Act.
Since the fee is flat, a patient seeking to “amortize her
investment” might go to the doctor very frequently.
Unnecessary visits might constitute “services substantially in
excess of the patient’s needs,” which cannot be compensated in
accordance with that act. 174 Finally, if concierge services are
offered to Medicare beneficiaries at below-market rates, they
may constitute “inducements” forbidden under the relevant fraud
and abuse laws.175
Yet there is a cost to such federal regulation. Overly
aggressive federal interventions could squelch all forms of
retainer care. Most of the physicians pioneering retainer
174

ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD, supra
note 27. (paraphrasing 42 USCA § 1320a-7(b)(6) (2005)).
175
42 U.S.C. § 1128A(i)(5) (2004); 42 C.F.R. 1003.101 (2004).
For a brief account of inducement provisions, see OIG Bulletin,
Offering Gifts and Other Inducements to Beneficiaries,
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/SABGiftsandInd
ucements.pdf, Aug. 2002 (“The OIG will apply the inducement
prohibition against the following: inexpensive gifts that have a retail
value of no more than $10 individually, and no more than $50 in the
aggregate annually per patient.” Also included are a series of statutory
and regulatory exceptions. See also Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique
Medicine a New Threat, supra note 40, at 336 (“If boutique medical
practices provide their patients with bonuses such as "heated towel
racks, free hotel rooms, [and] special bathrobes," these amenities could
violate the federal anti-kickback statute or the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act prohibiting such inducements.
However, since these amenities are offered after payment of a retainer,
it is likely that they will be seen as services provided in exchange for
payment and not as an "inducement."”).
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practices are committed professionals whose first priority is
providing quality health care. They are pioneering innovative
preventive care, and at least that aspect of retainer care deserves
to be encouraged.
Is there a way to craft a more tailored regulatory
response? In conditions of uncertainty, policymakers often turn
to the states as “laboratories of democracy.” Concentrated in big
cities on the coasts, retainer care practices have already attracted
some scrutiny from state regulators.
These embryonic
interventions, as well as established state practices in cognate
areas of health care “tiering,” provide a good starting point for
discussion of future regulation of retainer care.
The real challenge for policymakers is to craft a tailored
regulatory response to retainer care that discourages queuejumping and amenity-bundling while promoting preventive care.
States have begun to do so by characterizing retainer practices as
insurance providers. However, given the legal complexity of this
strategy, insurance regulation may not prove an effective way of
tailoring regulation. Rather, taxation targeted at the queuejumping and amenity-bundling aspects of retainer care would
provide a more effective response. Already applied to cosmetic
surgery and specialty hospitals, such taxation of retainer care—
particularly when directed at assuring access for the poor—would
assure some principled results from the tiering retainer care is
entrenching.
A. Retainer Care Agreement as Insurance Contract?
Since they sell unlimited amounts of physician time in
return for a flat fee, concierge care agreements have been deemed
a form of insurance in several states. 176
As the deputy
176

Sandi Doughton, State Looks Askance at Extra Fees for
Doctors, supra note 63, at B1 (“A draft ruling from the Insurance
Commissioner's Office says certain retainers and other charges are
illegal. Doctors who require insured patients to pay retainer fees for
routine medical care are violating state law, says a draft ruling from the
Washington Insurance Commissioner's Office. And "concierge" health
services, under which clients pay a flat rate for personalized medical
care, may be illegal if they're not licensed as health insurers, the
commissioner's office says.”
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commissioner of insurance in Washington stated, "The critical
element of the transaction is that risk of the patient's utilization of
health-care services during the period is transferred from the
patient to the provider for a set amount." 177 Even if a doctor
purposely limits her panels to a low number, she risks
simultaneous demands for care from two or more patients. 178
Furthermore, retainer practices might go out of business before
they can fulfill their promise to provide care.179 Each of these
risks is reminiscent of the types of problems insurers often have
to bond or reinsure against.180
177

Peter Neurath, Medical Retainer Fees Violate Law, Ruling
Says: State Law Bars Doctors From Charging Extra Fees, PUGET
SOUND BUSINESS JOURNAL, August 1, 2003, available at
http://seattle.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2003/08/04/story6.html?t=
printable. The relevant state official, Deputy Insurance Commissioner
Berendt, conceded that “No rules prevent doctors from charging extra
for optional services that aren't already covered by the patient's health
insurance, such as nutritional counseling, valet parking or 24-hour
cellphone access to doctors, Berendt said. It's also fine for doctors to
charge special fees to patients who aren't covered by insurance.” She
also elaborated that “[t]he fee is paid by the patient regardless of the
amount of services provided [and] even if no services are provided.
These arrangements result in a transfer of risk and, in essence, are
insurance agreements.” Id. Office of Insurance Commissioner for the
State of Washington, Forum for Review of Draft Technical Advisories
to Health Carriers and their Participating Providers (August 12,
2003),
available
at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/special/accessfees/removed/public%5Ffo
rum%5Fpresentation.ppt (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
178
Steven Flier did this when he began PPHC; “We intentionally
set the panel very low, at about 300 patients per physician.” Quoted in
Ferrarone and Stoller, supra note 118, at 6. Some “platinum” concierge
practices may only contract with 50 families per physician. Id.
179
Though I have not yet found examples of large upfront fees
paid in exchange for “lifetime care,” it is interesting to note that one of
the earliest insurance plans involved the exchange of an assurance of a
lifetime of care in return for investment in its infrastructure.
180
Robert M. Portman, Back to the Future of Medicine, supra note
2, at 3 (2003) (“To the extent that concierge practices charge their
members a fixed, prepaid amount for a bundle of guaranteed services,
they could be found to be providing insurance in violation of state
law.”) Any insurance provider must be registered with the state and
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Washington 181 and New Jersey 182 have been most
aggressive, issuing rules and interpretations that tightly regulated
retainer care. Other states have issued warnings and guidances,
but have done little to actually intervene. 183
If they were
regulated as insurers, retainer practices would have to satisfy
potentially onerous capitalization requirements, and could not be

bonded against the possibility it cannot provide the services/coverage
purchased in advance in consideration for the premium.
181
Id. According to Portman, “the Washington Insurance
Commissioner has issued a pair of draft technical assistance advisories
in which it has determined that health care providers entering into
arrangements to provide a package of health care services for a fixed,
pre-paid fee must first obtain a certificate of registration from the state
as either a health care service contractor or health maintenance
organization. In a separate draft advisory, the commissioner concluded
that health care providers that require patients to pay access fees to
receive services covered by their health insurance are acting in
violation of state laws requiring providers and plans not to charge more
than the covered amount and to hold patients harmless from any
amounts not covered by insurance.”
182
Bowden and Foust, Advanced Issues in Provider/Payer
Managed Care, supra note 115. (“During the summer of 2003
insurance regulators in Washington State circulated two draft
advisories warning against ‘access’ fees and regulators in New Jersey
issued a bulletin ordering providers to immediately terminate charging
patients access, retention, or service fees.”).
183
Some appear to tacitly, if not explicitly, endorse boutique
medicine as a legitimate new method of health care financing. See
Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the Future of Medicine,
supra note 2, at 6. (“The Massachusetts Department of Insurance
investigated Personal Physicians Health Care for discriminating against
patients who couldn't afford its annual fee but apparently found no
violation of state insurance laws as long as beneficiaries were advised
that insurance would not cover the extra fees. The Massachusetts Board
of Registration in Medicine, which licenses Massachusetts physicians,
also reportedly found nothing illegal about concierge practices.”)
According to Flier, he repeatedly met with state officials before
launching the pioneer Boston retainer practice, Personal Physicians
HealthCare, and currently retains lobbyists to assure favorable
regulatory treatment. Ferrarone and Stoller, supra note 118, at 10.
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as flexible in choosing their panels.184 Concierge practices have
aggressively lobbied for exceptions or favorable interpretations
of the relevant laws, and appear to have stalled legal
interventions in two states.185
For example, the state of Washington initially moved
rather aggressively to characterize retainer practices as
insurers, 186 thereby requiring them to certify that they are
financially prepared to deal with the “risks” of the practice. 187

184

Sandi Doughton, State looks askance at extra fees for doctors,
supra note 63, at B1.. (“[I]f doctors want to provide a broad range of
medical services for a set fee, they may need to be licensed and
regulated as insurers. The state requires insurers to prove they are
financially healthy and not likely to go out of business and leave
consumers with no medical care, [Deputy Insurance Commissioner]
Berendt said. The state also makes it difficult for insurers to kick out
patients.”).
185
Sandi Doughton, State looks askance at extra fees for doctors,
supra note 66, at B1.
186
Id. (“Seattle Medical Associates doesn't get any money from
Medicare or other insurance companies. If patients are referred to
specialists outside the group, those specialists bill insurance or
Medicare separately. But according to the commissioner's preliminary
rulings, the group may require a state insurance license, because it
operates somewhat like an insurance company.”)
187
See Kenneth T. Bowden and Lawrence Foust, Advanced Issues
in Provider/Payer Managed Care, supra note 115, at 6 (“Without
referring to its companion advisory regarding the business of insurance,
the latter advisory offered that access fees could be charged to patients
without violating statutory hold harmless provisions if the services
offered for the fee were truly noncovered and the fees were optional.
Mandatory fees could be charged when the patient is uninsured, the
provider is non-participating, or the patient is covered under an
indemnity policy that does not require use of a participating provider.
The draft advisories have been withdrawn before being finalized. In
addition, the Insurance Commissioner withdrew the pursuit of H.B.
2815 in the 2004 Washington Legislature in order to “develop
legislation that would address the needs of everyone.” See also John R.
Marquis, Legal Issues Involved in Concierge Medical Practices, supra
note 3, at 18 (also implying that the Washington Insurance
Commissioner is currently trying to develop a consensus on regulation
of retainer care, due to the Washington State Medical Society’s
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One regulator has also attempted to undermine the legal basis of
conversions to retainer care, stating that “it's illegal to force
patients who have health insurance to pay a retainer fee simply to
keep their existing doctor or to get services their health-care
policy already guarantees.” 188 After retainer physicians and
clients registered their vehement opposition to such rules, the
“draft technical assistance advisories” announcing the agency’s
position disappeared from the state government’s website, and
officials have announced an effort to find “common ground.”
New Jersey regulators also began with an aggressive
approach, but failed to garner support from the politicians. The
New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services and
Department of Banking and Insurance have issued a
memorandum prohibiting insurers from contracting with doctors
who require patients to pay fees for access, even when fees are
for additional services. 189 The Departments asserted that New
Jersey’s “non-discrimination” laws prevent practitioners
participating in managed care networks from conditioning access
to their clinic on retainer-like payments. 190 However, it is
difficult to assess the legal force of this document, and it is hard

successful opposition to the Insurance Commissioner’s effort to get the
legislature to “codify the content” of its advisories as a statute).
188
Michael and Laura B. Benko, These doctors and their affluent
patients find themselves in exclusive company, supra note 67, at 38.
(“Paul Ginsburg, president of the Center for Studying Health System
Change, a Washington-based research group, says there's nothing to
stop a physician from charging wealthy, fee-for-service clients
whatever they choose. The problem, he says, arises when companies
such as MDVIP offer services only to members, thus denying access to
many longtime patients either unwilling or unable to pay the annual
fees.”).
189
See Holly Bakke and Clifton Lacy, Impermissible Practice of
Retainer Medicine by Network Physicians, available at
http://www.state.nj.us/health/hcsa/bulletins/joint2003-02.pdf
190
“Rather, the Departments’ position is that retainer agreements
are inconsistent with the requirement that all provider agreements
subject to New Jersey law assure that in-network providers do not
discriminate in treatment of members or covered persons.” New Jersey
DHSS/DOBI Bulletin, citing N.J.A.C. § 8:38-15.2(b)8 and N.J.A.C. §
8:38A-4.15(b)7.
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to find evidence that retainer care has been eliminated in New
Jersey.191
Regulation of retainer practices as insurance may be on
shaky ground legally as well as politically. Such regulation
hinges on an assertion that retainer practices bear risk in a
manner similar to that of traditional insurers.192 However, it is
easy to imagine ways of contracting out of such risk. For
example, a retainer contract might promise 24/7 attention, unless
another member of the plan demanded the physician’s attention
immediately before one calls. Or it might shift the risk of
insolvency onto the patient, or effectively disguise the transfer of
risk by having the patient pay in arrears instead of in advance.
Finally, even though sick patients may be very demanding of
their primary care physician’s time, the physician is not
promising the broad range of services traditionally packaged by
insurers. If the baseline contract for additional services is legal, it
is difficult to see how these limitations on service would be
forbidden. Professor Thomas Mayo has questioned Washington
state’s application of its insurance laws to retainer practices:
In what sense do the doctors take on risk? The care
isn't pre-paid with the retainer; only access is prepaid. The patient's health insurer is going to be
tapped for the care, and no part of the insurer's risk is
being shifted downstream to the physician. Granted,
there is some risk that the demand for services at any
given time might outstrip the physician's ability to
schedule, but that's not a financial risk, is it?193
191

John R. Marquis, Legal Issues Involved in Concierge Medical
Practices, supra note 3, at 18.
192
This is an attractive “peg” to hang regulation on, since many
retainer practices contract for an unknown amount of care for a fixed
annual fee. The retainer physician risks taking on extraordinarily
demanding patients who may well demand far more care than average.
193
See Mayo, Medical retainer fee (a/k/a "boutique medicine")
nixed in Washington, HEALTHLAWBLOG, August 5, 2003, available at
http://healthlawblog.blogspot.com/2003/08/medical-retainer-fee-akaboutique.html. Nevertheless, one practitioner warns that any retainer
practice which “provides unlimited physician office visits” might end
up being regulated as an insurer. Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care:
Back to the Future of Medicine, supra note 1, at 5 (“Unlike physician
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Some mid-1990s guidelines regarding the regulation of “provider
sponsored organizations” echoed this distinction, noting that
providers could commit to potentially unlimited amounts of their
own time (in return for a fee), and this would not represent
financial risk.194
B. Targeting Queue-Jumping and Amenity-Bundling via
Taxation
Given the legal uncertainty surrounding the regulation of
concierge care agreements as insurance, another tool of legal
intervention is likely necessary. An indisputably positive facet of
extant retainer care practices provides an important clue on where
to look. Some boutique medicine practitioners use the time
gained from retainer practice to provide pro bono care—a model
well-established in legal practice. 195 Moreover, some large
retainer practices, such as one based at Tufts University, directly
subsidize access to care for the disadvantaged. Instead of
“passing the retainer fee from wealthy patients to wealthy

networks or IPAs, which have generally been found not to be insurance
companies because there is another risk bearing entity in the chain of
treatment and payment--i.e., a health insurer or HMO--is subject to
state insurance regulations, concierge practices that do not accept
insurance and provided prepaid medical care may be perceived as the
only risk bearing entity in the patient's chain of care.”).
194
Allison Overbay and Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of
Providers That Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 (1996); Edward B.
Hirshfeld, et al., Structuring Provider-Sponsored Organizations: The
Legal and Regulatory Hurdles, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 297 (Sept. 1999);
John S. Conniff, Regulating Managed Health Care Provider Sponsored
Organizations, 16 J. INS. REG. 377 (1998). Federal regulation has also
sparked academic commentary. See, e.g., Michael O. Spivey,
Developing Provider-Sponsored Organization Solvency Standards
Through Negotiated Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1999).
195
Jennifer Silverman, Retainer practices reporting better care,
supra note 52, at 71 (“Charity care for retainer physicians averaged
9.14 hours per months versus 7.48 hours per month for nonretainer
practices.”).
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physicians, the hospital is using the money to subsidize the
hospital’s primary care practice.”196
To the extent these countervailing, socially conscious
practices arise out of retainer care, we might say that it causes
“difference principled” tiering, after the famous proviso of
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (stipulating that any increase in
inequality was acceptable to the extent it raised the welfare of the
least well off).197 It is doubtful that such “difference principled”
tiering currently outweighs the “brute tiering” that denies the
services of retainer doctors to those who cannot afford their fees.
However, states can begin using targeted taxation to alleviate
brute tiering and promoting “difference principled” tiering arising
out of retainer care.
For example, states have already addressed the diversion
of medical resources to nonmedical ends via tax policy in the
context of plastic surgery. New Jersey has imposed a 6 percent
tax on cosmetic plastic surgery procedures.198 Illinois has been
considering a similar effort with redistributive designs—funds
from a “vanity tax” would be earmarked for medical research.199
A similar tax on the amenities bundled into concierge care
196

This is the Tufts-New England Medical Center plan featured in
Steve Smith, The Boutique Medicine Boom: Perspectives on the
Growth of a Controversial Trend, PRACTICE BUILDERS, Sept./Oct.
2003, at 1.
197
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) ("All social
values--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of
self-respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage.").
I have coined the term “difference principled” to designate tiering that
is both principled, and in accord with Rawls’s theory of justice.
198
N.J.S.A. § 54:32E-1 (2005) (“There is imposed and shall be
paid a tax of 6% on the gross receipts from a cosmetic medical
procedure, which shall be paid by the subject of the cosmetic medical
procedure . . . .”); see also Susan Jones, New Jersey Taxes Cosmetic
Surgery,
CNSNEWS,
July
1,
2004,
available
at
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=%5CNation%5Carchi
ve%5C200407%5CNAT20040701a.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
199
Beth Kapes, Vanity Tax Would Fund Stem Cell Research,
COSMETIC SURGERY TIMES, May 1, 2005, available at
http://www.cosmeticsurgerytimes.com/cosmeticsurgerytimes/article/art
icleDetail.jsp?id=157357 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
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agreements would help assure that some portion of the money
spent to divert medical resources to nonmedical ends would itself
be diverted back toward genuine health care.
Admittedly, valuation problems are sure to arise. Just as
New Jersey regulators have been skeptical about retainer
physicians’ ability to distinguish between ordinary medical care
(meriting insurance reimbursement) and retainer services (paid
for by retainer fees), critics of my proposal may charge that
retainer clients are paying for the entire experience of retainer
care and that no particular aspect of that experience can be
disaggregated from the whole and given a market value.
However, as the diversity of concierge practices increases, it
should be easier to perform the type of hedonic pricing that has
allowed economists to, for example, price the value of an eighthstory view of a park. 200 No one sells “eighth-story views of
parks” on eBay, but economists can compare the prices of very
similar apartments with and without such views and develop a
rough sense of how much the view itself contributes to the value
of the property.201 Similarly, we can begin to assess the value of
a given retainer perquisite by comparing the cost of joining that

200

See Maureen L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675, 703-710 (discussing how
“the price of a house or job can be decomposed into the prices of the
attributes that make up the good, such as air quality,” and assessing
methods of such decomposition, including wage-amenity studies,
hedonic labor markets, and hedonic travel costs). See also Brian
Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural
Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 1029 (1995); F.B. Croos, Natural Resource Valuation,
42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989); David McKay, CERCLA's Natural
Resource Damage Valuation Provisions: A Comprehensive and
Innovative Approach to Protecting the Environment, 45 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1417 (1988).
201
In the hedonic pricing method, “an attempt is made to estimate
an implicit price for environmental attributes by looking at real markets
in which these characteristics are effectively traded. Thus, ‘clean air’
and ‘peace and quiet’ are effectively traded in the property market since
purchasers of houses and land do consider these environmental
dimensions as characteristics of property.” PEARCE AND MORAN, THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF BIODIVERSITY 67 (1995).
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practice with the cost of joining a practice that offers all but that
perquisite.
Less ambitiously, regulators may just ask for an
accounting of the cost of the amenities provided by the retainer
practice. Personal Physicians HealthCare of Boston has spent at
least a million dollars on a luxury waiting area appointed with
fine furniture and art. 202 A rough accounting of the practice
resources and physician time devoted to amenity services should
provide some basis for a tax on them.
Some forward-looking retainer practices have begun to
recognize and counteract their negative effects on access to care.
For example, one teaching hospital in Massachusetts has used
retainers to fund its charity care. 203 To the extent a retainer
practice takes on this type of redistribution itself, it might be
exempted from taxation designed for the same ends. 204
Furthermore, a state may decide not to tax retainer revenues that
support preventive care services not covered by insurance.
Taxation is an important policy tool here because
increasing numbers of retainer physicians may evade insuranceleveraged regulation by becoming “cash-only.” 205 This latter
202

Ferrarone and Stoller, PPHC Case Study, supra note 118, at 10.
See Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat,
supra note 41, at 323.
204
Another example is the cataract clinic in India mentioned in an
article generally supportive of concierge care. The author mentions a
“scenario whereby the profits from the boutique practiced were used to
finance a second practice that provided the same service, same worldclass technology and cutting edge methods, minus a few of the red
carpet frills to the population of poor patients. A fantasy? Hardly, it
exists right now, in India in a practice founded by Dr. Govindappa
Venkataswamy over twenty five years ago. His Aravind Eye Hospital is
now performing 180,000 cataract operations a year, 70 percent of them
for free.” Justin C. Matus, Boutique Medicine: Good medicine with a
bad
taste
or
just
bad
medicine?
,
available
at
http://www.aameda.org/MemberServices/Exec/Articles/winter03/bouti
quemedMatus.pdf , citing JOAN MAGRETTA, WHAT MANAGEMENT IS
(2002).
205
Oklahoma has, for instance, considered taxing specialty
hospitals directly. S.B. 621, 2003 Leg., 49th Sess. (Okla. 2003); H.B.
1188, 2003 Leg., 49th Sess. (Okla. 2003). Specialty hospitals have
raised concerns because they divert the most lucrative cases to
203
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development may raise even more serious concerns regarding
access to care, since cash-only practices often consist of a very
small number of clients paying a very large retainer. For
example, under one Seattle plan, each physician takes on 50
families per year, at a cost of 20,000 per family, grossing one
million dollars per year. Because of their extremely restricted
scope, these practices raise concerns similar to those raised by
amenity services: namely, the diversion of medical resources to
nonmedical ends.206
VII. CONCLUSION
Most of the physicians pioneering retainer practices are
committed professionals whose first priority is providing quality
health care. Unfortunately, what is professionally and personally
rewarding for these doctors may harm society as a whole.
specialized centers that usually do not provide the level of community
services expected from general hospitals. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SPECIALTY HOSPITALS: GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, SERVICES
PROVIDED, AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCES, GAO REP. NO. 04-167
(Oct. 2003); William Lynk and Carina Longely, The Effect of Physician
Owned Surgicenters on Hospital Outpatient Surgery, 21(4) HEALTH
AFF. 215 (Jul./Aug. 2002); FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note
68, at 918 (discussing state taxation and regulation of specialty
hospitals).
206
The nonmedical end here is the absolute assurance of the
retainer customers that they will be able to call on their retained
physician in case of illness. Steven Flier of PPHC reports that, even
with a panel of 300 patients, he has never had two conflicting demands
on his time in his 3 years of retainer practice. Stoller and Ferrarone,
Personal Physicians Healthcare, supra note 118, at 12. Demanding a
panel of one-sixth this size (as one very exclusive Seattle practice does)
makes the physician retained less a doctor than a courtier, whose
primary value derives not from the medical services offered but rather
from the sense of assurance and superiority flowing from the client’s
ability to “reserve” the time of a skilled professional so absolutely. See
Friedman, supra note 156 (“[I]sn't there a decreasing rate of return on
the amount of time spent with a single patient? At some point, paying
more attention to someone won't really make him or her healthier; it
will just satisfy a desire to be pampered. The new practice could end up
being more about extravagant service for relatively wealthy people than
about effective medical care.”).
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Retainer medicine raises difficult policy questions because it
combines a set of eminently sensible incentives (for more
primary care physicians providing a higher quality of care) with
financing methods that further stratify access to care and threaten
to generate a positional bidding war for supplemental, providersponsored insurance.
So far, legal disputes over concierge care have focused on
whether retainer payments constitute “balance billing” for
services covered by Medicare. This article has suggested a way
to resolve that issue, by disaggregating retainer services into
preventive care, queue-jumping, and amenity-bundling. To the
extent a retainer practice can plausibly claim that its patients’
retainers are funding noncovered preventive care and amenities,
they should be safe from liability for balance billing. But to the
extent the retainer is funding quicker access to better care, it is a
second charge for services already covered by insurance.
Given the importance of queue-jumping to the boutique
medicine business model, most retainers would constitute
balance billing under the approach proposed in this article.
Federal regulators could leverage such violations into more
aggressive efforts to discourage retainer practices, including
prosecution under the False Claims Act. For now, though, such
a strategy appears ill-advised. Regulation of retainer care should
instead focus on a targeted discouragement of queue-jumping
and amenity-bundling via taxation. Such an approach would
only raise the price of retainer care, and not ban it outright.
Moreover, it could be neutral toward (or perhaps even subsidize)
personalized preventive care.
Of course, a nuanced approach should not be a
complacent one. Left unregulated, the battle between costcutting insurers and revenue-maximizing doctors may result in
inefficiencies bordering on cruelty. As the commodification of
medicine advances, we might see hints of its future development
in service industries where business imperatives have been
untrammeled by social objectives. Consider the following
account of fare structures and service in French railways:
It is not because of the few thousand francs which
would have to be spent to put a roof over the thirdclass carriages or to upholster the third-class seats
that some company or other has open carriages with
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wooden benches . . . .What the company is trying to
do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the
second-class fare from travelling third class; it hits
the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to
frighten the rich . . . . And it is again for the same
reason that the companies, having proved almost
cruel to third-class passengers and mean to the
second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with
first-class passengers. Having refused the poor what
is necessary, they give the rich what is
superfluous.207
As “budgetary crises” lead to further cuts in Medicaid, the
uninsured “third-class” of American health care consumers is
sure to suffer more privations.208 Managed care has made the
“second-class” insured uncomfortable enough to find the
blandishments of “first class” retainer care appealing, even at a
price tag of several thousand dollars annually. Given positional
pressures to “keep up with the Joneses,” the well-off (or those
who would like to appear so) are likely to find retainer care a
necessary accoutrement of their social station—or at least a way
of controlling their schedule in a manner expected of
contemporary professionals.
There is no doubt they will be getting value for their
money: most retainer physicians are committed to providing the
207

Jules Dupuit, On Tolls and Transport Charges 23 (International
Economic Papers No. 11, Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1962), quoted in
James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2007 (2000). See also BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE
INNER LIFE OF THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 34 (1989) (discussing
the role fear plays in motivating class distinctions).
208
See Bob Herbert, Curing Health Care Costs: Let the Sick
Suffer, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1, 2005) (describing cuts to TennCare
program); WALL ST. J., Taming the Medicaid Monster, Aug. 23, 2005;
Gardiner Harris, Gee, Fixing Welfare Seemed Like a Snap, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2005, 4. Though many Medicaid “reformers” claim that
increasing spending on the program amounts to a “fiscal crisis,” they
appear hesitant to admit the degree to which the
”crisis” arises from discretionary choices to cut taxes on income not
derived from labor.
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highest quality of primary care. But as those fortunate enough to
opt for retainer care exit the dominant system, those left behind
lose a powerful voice for reform within it. Those who pay
retainer fees “jump the queue” of rationing tacitly imposed by
managed care, and provide a market for the bundling of basic or
preventive health care with luxurious amenities. Targeted
regulation may not eliminate these effects, but it can check them.
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